In Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale (2024) 16 Cal.5th 643, the California Supreme Court adopted a new “bright line” rule for the time to appeal in administrative mandate proceedings. The Court held that the time to appeal begins to run from the date of entry of judgment or service of notice of entry of judgment, rather than with the filing of—or service of notice of the filing of—an order or other ruling. In doing so, the Court overturned the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision and settled a split in published authority.

Background

In May 2019, a petitioner filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate against the City of Sunnyvale challenging a temporary suspension of employment. On August 6, 2020, the trial court filed an order denying the petition. The trial court entered judgment on September 25, 2020.

The petitioner filed a notice of appeal on October 15, 2020. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as untimely holding that the order filed on August 6, 2020, was the “final judgment” that triggered the time to appeal.  The Court of Appeal reasoned that the August 6, 2020, order denied the petition leaving no further action to be contemplated. In its decision, the Court of Appeal acknowledged a split in authority on the timeliness issue.

The California Supreme Court granted review.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court began its discussion by explaining that Code of Civil Procedure Section 904.1 sets forth a list of appealable judgments and orders, one of which is commonly referred to as the “one final judgment” rule. The Court observed that an order granting or denying a petition for writ of mandate is not one of the appealable orders listed in Section 904.1, and the language of Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 contemplated entry of a judgment in an administrative writ proceeding. Therefore, the Court concluded, that in administrative writ proceedings, it is the entry of judgment—rather than the filing of an order—that signals the end of the proceeding.

The Supreme Court found that in some instances, including writ proceedings, courts have exercised discretion to allow a premature notice of appeal prior to official entry of judgment where an order or ruling is “sufficiently final,” in the context of preserving a right to appeal. The Supreme Court underscored, in contrast, that it was unaware of any case where a court construed a ruling as a judgment for the purposes of dismissing an appeal as untimely. Accordingly, the Court declined to do so here holding that the time to appeal an administrative mandate proceeding begins with the entry of judgment or service of notice of entry of judgment, not with the filing of an order or other ruling.

The Court explained that a bright line rule provides clarity to litigants. If any order deemed “sufficiently final” could start the time to appeal, parties would need to guess whether that, or any prior ruling, would be construed by the appellate court as the judgment that commenced the running of the clock. Without such clarity, filing of multiple protective appeals to ensure they are not untimely would become the norm.

– Adam Nir