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Casey A. Shorrock

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Casey A. Shorrock

Associate

Ms. Shorrock joined the firm as an associate in 2019. Her practice focuses on environmental and land use law and includes CEQA, NEPA, natural resources, endangered species and wetlands, air and water quality, climate change, solid waste, wildfire prevention regulation, and local environmental and land use ordinances. Ms. Shorrock also specializes in preparing and reviewing complex environmental documentation and managing consultant involvement.

Ms. Shorrock’s representative matters include:

  • Associate outside counsel to the High Speed Rail Authority of the State of California for the environmental planning and permitting of the Statewide High-Speed Rail Project.
  • Associate outside counsel representing the City of Los Angeles in successful Ninth Circuit litigation challenging the FAA’s approval of the Bob Hope “Hollywood Burbank” Airport Replacement Passenger Terminal Project and issuance of its Final EIS/ROD under NEPA (City of Los Angeles v. Federal Aviation Administration (2023) (9th Cir.) 63 F.4th 835).
  • Associate outside counsel representing the City of Monterey in successful litigation challenging the approval of the Monterey Peninsula Airport District’s Updated Airport Master Plan and certification of the addendum to its Final EIR.
  • Associate outside counsel representing the Town of Danville in successful litigation challenging Contra Costa County’s approval of the Tassajara Parks Mixed-Use Development Project and certification of its Final EIR.
  • Associate outside counsel representing East Sacramento Ranch, LLC, in litigation defending Sacramento County’s approval of the NewBridge Specific Plan and certification of its Final EIR, resulting in successful settlement.
  • Associate outside counsel to Westpark Communities for the successful approval of the Sierra View & Sierra Vista Specific Plan Redesignation and Rezoning Project combined CEQA document in the City of Roseville.
  • Associate outside counsel to Divert, Inc., for environmental planning and permitting of its successfully approved organic waste recovery and reuse facilities in the City of Turlock.
  • Associate outside counsel representing the City of Los Angeles in litigation challenging approval of its Sidewalk and Transit Amenities Program and adoption of its MND.
  • Associate outside counsel to the City of Los Angeles for its Safe Sidewalks LA Program EIR.
  • Associate outside counsel representing Evergreen Sierra East, LLC, and Cresleigh Homes Corporation for the College Park Mixed-Use Development Project EIR in the City of Rocklin, resulting in successful settlement.

Prior to attending law school, Ms. Shorrock had a career as an environmental consultant and planner, working with and for agencies at all levels of government, with special experience on tribal projects. Ms. Shorrock managed the environmental review process for a variety of development and infrastructure projects and government actions, including preparation of state, federal, tribal, and joint environmental documents, alongside a focus on federal permitting and streamlining of environmental regulatory compliance.

During law school, Ms. Shorrock interned for Judge Kimberley J. Mueller at the U.S. District Court, Eastern District of California, and worked as a researcher and editor for a UC Davis law school professor on an article testing administrative law theories. Ms. Shorrock also was a summer associate for Remy Moose Manley, LLP. While at McGeorge, Ms. Shorrock was awarded the Stauffer Charitable Trust Fellowship for her paper Environmentally Responsible and Streamlined Development in California: The Promise of CEQA’s Class 32 Exemption and Witkin Awards for academic excellence in Environmental Law and Oceans/Coastal Law. Ms. Shorrock attended law school on a full merit scholarship as an Anthony M. Kennedy Fellow.

Education

  • J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, 2019 (with distinction)
    (Water and Environmental Concentration)
  • B.A., Literature, University of California, Santa Cruz, 1999

Professional Affiliations

  • State Bar of California, No. 328414,
    Environmental Law Section
  • U.S. District Court, Eastern District of California
  • U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
  • Federal Bar Association, Sacramento Chapter
  • California Lawyers Association
  • American Bar Association
  • Sacramento County Bar Association
  • California Association of Environmental Professionals

Bridget K. McDonald

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Bridget K. McDonald

Associate

Bridget K. McDonald is an associate attorney in the Sacramento-based boutique law firm of Remy Moose Manley, LLP, which specializes in environmental law, land use and planning, water law, initiatives and referenda, and administrative law generally. Ms. McDonald joined the firm in 2019.

Ms. McDonald’s practice focuses on land use/zoning, environmental, and housing law, handling all phases of the land use entitlement and permitting processes, including administrative approvals and litigation. Her practice includes issues arising under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the State Planning and Zoning Law, the Housing Accountability Act, the State Density Bonus Law, the State General Plan Law, the California Coastal Act, the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA), the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), and other state and federal environmental, land use/zoning, housing, and municipal statutes.

Ms. McDonald received her Bachelors and Masters of Arts degrees in environmental studies from the University of Southern California, and her Juris Doctorate from the University of California at Davis. Prior to law school, Ms. McDonald oversaw the Los Angeles events and outreach department for the national nonprofit organization, Best Friends Animal Society. During law school, Ms. McDonald was the managing editor of Environs, the Environmental Law and Policy Journal, the symposium chair for the Environmental Law Society, and the co-founder of the Student Animal Legal Defense Fund. As a student, Ms. McDonald practiced in the Aoki Water Justice Clinic, externed for the California Department of Water Resources and the State Water Resources Control Board’s Office of Enforcement, and worked as the firm’s 2018 summer associate.

Ms. McDonald’s representative and advisory matters include:

  • Outside counsel to the City of Los Angeles in several ongoing litigation matters defending the City’s compliance with CEQA for various development projects.
  • Outside counsel to the County of Humboldt in several ongoing litigation matters defending the County’s compliance with CEQA for various approvals and cannabis matters.
  • Outside counsel to the Marina Coast Water District in several ongoing litigation actions relating to a large desalination plant.
  • Outside counsel to Rogal Partners and Eldridge Renewal in connection with the Sonoma Developmental Center Specific Plan housing development project.
  • Advise and assist the City of Alameda in connection with reviewing and commenting on CEQA and NEPA documents prepared for projects proposed at the Oakland International Airport and the Port of Oakland.
  • Advise and assist the Port of Los Angeles with its CEQA review of various projects.
  • Provide pro-bono legal assistance to the non-profit organizations of We Are Up, Keep the Code, Inc., and the Tahoe Prosperity Center.
  • Selected Cases:
    • United Neighborhoods for Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1075 (counsel of record for the City of Los Angeles in CEQA action challenging the City’s approval of the Whitley Hotel project).
    • Marina Coast Water District v. County of Monterey (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 46 (assisted with trial and appellate litigation representing Marina Coast Water District in CEQA action challenging the County’s approval of development permits to construct a proposed desalination plant).
    • East Oakland Stadium Alliance v. City of Oakland (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1226 (assisted with trial and appellate litigation representing the Oakland Athletics Investment Group LLC in CEQA action challenging new MLB ball-park and mixed-use development project at Howard Terminal in the City of Oakland).
    • HUM CPR Affiliates v. Couty of Humboldt (Cal. Ct. App., 2022 [A161918]) (counsel of record for County of Humboldt; successfully upheld denial of petition based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies in action challenging County’s approval of zoning text amendments).
    • Lehman v. County of Humboldt (Cal. Ct. App., 2022 [A162986]) (counsel of record for County of Humboldt; successfully cross-appealed denial of motion to dismiss due to petitioner’s failure to comply with Public Resources Code section 21167.4).

Education

  • J.D., University of California at Davis, King Hall School of Law, 2019 (Environmental Law & Public Service Certificates)
  • M.A., Environmental Studies, University of Southern California, 2013
  • B.A., Environmental Studies, Minor in Spanish, University of Southern California, 2012

Professional Affiliations & Community Activities

  • State Bar of California, No. 327697
  • Admitted to all California State Courts
  • U.S. District Court, Eastern District of California
  • California Land Use Law and Policy Reporter, Editorial Board (2020–present)
  • California Lawyers Association, Environmental Law, Public Law, and Litigation Sections
  • California Lawyers Association, Programs Committee (2020–2022)
  • Sacramento County Bar Association, Environmental Law Section
  • UC Davis School of Law, Alumni/Student Mentorship Program (2020–present)
  • Selected for inclusion in the Rising Stars section of the Northern California Super Lawyers® magazine (2023–present)
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James G. Moose

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James G. Moose

Senior Partner

Mr. Moose joined the firm in 1986 as an associate, became a partner in 1990, and is now the longest-serving partner in the firm.  His practice focuses on land use, water, and environmental matters, with an emphasis on issues arising under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the State Planning and Zoning Law, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Endangered Species Act, the California Endangered Species Act, and other relevant land use and environmental statutes.  He represents public agencies, project proponents, consulting firms, non-profit organizations, and individuals.  He handles all phases of the land use entitlement process and permitting processes, including administrative approvals and litigation. Over the course of his career, he has also participated in drafting amendments to CEQA and the CEQA Guidelines.

Along with his former partner Tina Thomas and Whit Manley (Of Counsel to RMM), Mr. Moose is co-author of Guide to the California Environmental Quality Act (11th ed. 2007, Solano Press Books).

Representative matters in which Mr. Moose is currently involved, or has recently been involved, include the following:

  • Outside counsel to the City of Salinas on a variety of land use matters;
  • Outside counsel to the City of Santa Cruz on a variety of environmental, land use, and water-related matters;
  • Outside counsel to San Diego County relating to matters involving litigation over the County’s Climate Action Plan;
  • Counsel to Del Puerto Water District with respect to legal challenges to its EIR for the Del Puerto Canyon Reservoir project;
  • CEQA counsel to the Semitropic Water Storage District with respect to the proposed Tulare Lake Storage and Floodwater Protection Project
  • Counsel to the Semitropic Water Storage District Groundwater Sustainability Agency with respect to projects implementing that body’s Groundwater Sustainability Plan;
  • Counsel to CommonSpirit Health in connection with a hospital expansion in the City of Stockton and other hospital projects in California;
  • Land use counsel to Love’s Travel Stops & Country Stores with respect to the company’s proposed travel centers in California;
  • Counsel to Cresleigh Homes Corporation and Evergreen Sierra East, LLC, with respect to the College Park housing project in the City of Rocklin;
  • Counsel to Dana Reserve, LLC, with respect to the Dana Reserve Specific Plan in San Luis Obispo County;
  • Counsel to Best Development Group with respect to Grocery Outlet projects in King City and the City of Fort Bragg;
  • Counsel to Buzz Oates Construction with respect to the Givannoni Logistics project in the City of American Canyon and the Suisun Logistics Center project in the City of Suisun;
  • Counsel to Westpark Communities regarding various development projects in the City of Roseville;
  • Counsel to RiverWalk, LLC, with respect to the River Walk Specific Plan, proposed for annexation into the City of Riverbank in Stanislaus County;
  • Counsel to Friant Ranch LP in litigation over the adequacy of Fresno County’s EIR for the Friant Ranch Specific Plan and in continuing planning efforts related to that project;
  • Counsel for the R. Jeter Family Trust in connection with the Dorsey Marketplace project in the City of Grass Valley;
  • Counsel for Star Concrete in connection with proposed mining operations in San Benito County;
  • Counsel to the K H Moss Company with respect to litigation over mini-storage facilities in Granite Bay in Placer County;
  • Counsel to Metro Air Park, LLC, in connection with zoning amendments affecting land uses in the Metro Air Park Special Planning Area in Sacramento County;
  • Counsel for Placer Ranch Inc., in Placer County litigation over the Placer Ranch Specific Plan and Sunset Area Plan projects;
  • Counsel for East Sacramento Ranch, LLC, in connection with the NewBridge Specific Plan project in Sacramento County;
  • Litigation counsel to Yorba Linda Estates, LLC, with respect to its Esperanza Hills project in Orange County adjacent to Chino Hills State Park;
  • Counsel to Rancho Cañada Venture, LLC, with respect to the Rancho Cañada Village Project in Monterey County;
  • Counsel for Oakmont Senior Living with respect to its proposed Villages at Town Center West project in El Dorado County;
  • CEQA counsel to the Klamath River Renewal Corporation, which is responsible for removing multiple hydroelectric dams on the Klamath River in order to recreate free-flowing conditions for the benefit of anadromous fish;
  • Outside counsel to Marin County with respect to litigation in which the Salmon Protection and Watershed Network (SPAWN) and other environmental groups have challenged the County’s General Plan with respect to land use policies in the San Geronimo Valley;
  • Outside counsel to the California Department of Water Resources with respect to proposed new water diversion and conveyance facilities in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta;
  • Outside counsel to the California Department of Water Resources with respect to the preparation of an environmental report for the long-term operations of the State Water Project;
  • Outside counsel to the California Board of Forestry and Fire Protection with respect to the preparation of a programmatic environmental impact report for the California Vegetation Treatment Program (Cal VTP), which involves the use of prescribed fires and other techniques to reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire and to restore forest health, and in litigation over the approval of that project;
  • Outside counsel to the California High-Speed Rail Authority in CEQA litigation over the adequacy of the EIR for the Merced to Fresno segment of the future statewide high-speed train system;
  • Outside counsel to the California Governor’s Office and the California Department of Conservation with respect to the EIR required by Senate Bill 4 (Pavley 2013) on the subject of “well stimulation treatment” (including hydraulic fracturing) in California;
  • Outside counsel to the Santa Cruz County Regional Transportation Commission with respect to the proposed North Coast Rail Trail Project;
  • Outside counsel to the City of Roseville on a variety of land use and environmental matters;
  • Outside counsel to the Sonoma Valley Unified School District with respect to litigation over the District’s Sonoma Valley High School Athletic Fields Renovation Project;
  • Outside counsel to the Sierra Community College District with respect to its Facilities Master Plan Update for its Sierra College Campus in Rocklin; and
  • Outside counsel to the North Kern Water District with respect to CEQA issues associated with competing water rights applications on the Kern River.

Published Cases

Parkford Owners for a Better Community v. Windeshausen (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 216; Sierra Club v. County of Fresno (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 979; Parkford Owners for a Better Community v. County of Placer (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 714; Sierra Club v. County of Fresno (2018) 6 Cal.5th 502; High Sierra Rural Alliance v. County of Plumas (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 102; Friends of the College of San Mateo Gardens v. San Mateo County Community College District (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 596; Mission Bay Alliance v. Office of Community Investment and Infrastructure (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 160; Friends of the College of San Mateo Gardens v. San Mateo County Community College District (2016) 1 Cal.5th 937; Keep Our Mountains Quiet v. County of Santa Clara (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 714; Citizens for a Green San Mateo v. San Mateo Community College District (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1572; South County Citizens for Smart Growth v. County of Nevada (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 316; Alliance for the Protection of the Auburn Community Environment v. County of Placer (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 25; Habitat and Watershed Caretakers v. City of Santa Cruz (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1277; Salmon Protection and Watershed Network v. County of Marin (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 195; Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach (2011) 52 Cal.4th 155; California Native Plant Society v. City of Santa Cruz (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 957; California Native Plant Society v. City of Rancho Cordova (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 603; Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412; Sierra Club v. County of Napa (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1490; Californians Against Waste v. California Department of Conservation (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 317; CalBeach Advocates v. City of Solana Beach (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 529; County of Amador v. El Dorado County Water Agency (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 931; Chaparral Greens v. City of Chula Vista (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1134;  Stanislaus Audubon Society, Inc. v. Stanislaus County (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 144; Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559; Sacramento County v. Local Agency Formation Commission (1992) 3 Cal.4th 903;City of Sacramento v. State Water Resources Control Board (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 960; Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors of Santa Barbara (1990) 52 Cal.3d 553; Oro Fino Gold Mining Corp. v. County of El Dorado (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 872; Kings County Farm Bureau v. City of Hanford (1990)  221 Cal.App.3d 692; Midway Orchards v. County of Butte (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 765; Mountain Lion Coalition et al. v. California Fish and Game Commission et al.(1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1043; City of Hanford v. Superior Court (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 580;Citizens for Quality Growth v. City of Mt Shasta (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 433; and Emmington v. Solano County Redevelopment Agency (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 491.

For many years, Mr. Moose regularly taught CEQA courses and seminars or lectures for such organizations as the UC Davis Extension Program, the Association of Environmental Professionals, CLE International, Lorman International, and the California Continuing Education of the Bar program, State Bar Environmental Law Conference at Yosemite. He serves on the Advisory Board to the Center for Law, Energy, and the Environment (CLEE) at Berkeley Law. He is also former President of Solar Cookers International, a Sacramento-based international nonprofit corporation focused on encouraging the use of solar thermal cooking around the world.

Education

  • J.D., University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, 1985
  • B.A., English/History, University of California, Berkeley, 1981 (cum laude; phi beta kappa)

Professional Affiliations

  • State Bar of California – Environmental Law and Public Law Sections
  • California State Courts
  • United States Supreme Court
  • United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
  • United States District Court, Eastern District of California
  • United States District Court, Northern District of California
  • Articles Editor, Ecology Law Quarterly,
  • Selected for inclusion in 2009-2022 Northern California Super Lawyers ® magazine
  • Selection to the Sacramento Business Journal’s Best of the Bar 2014
  • “AV” rating, Martindale-Hubbell

Community Involvement

  • Former President, Solar Cookers International, Inc.
  • Advisory Board Member, Center for Law, Energy and the Environment at Berkeley Law
  • Board Member, Gifts to Share, Inc.
  • Former Board Member, Sacramento City-County Solid Waste Advisory Committee
  • Former Board Member, Environmental Council of Sacramento

Klamath River Renewal Project

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Klamath River Renewal Project

The Klamath River Renewal Corporation (KRRC) proposes to take ownership of four PacifiCorp dams on the Klamath River—JC Boyle, Copco, No. 1 & 2, and Iron Gate—and then remove these dams, restore formerly inundated lands, and implement required mitigation measures in compliance with applicable federal, state, and local regulations. Removal of the four hydroelectric dams is the first crucial step to restore the health of the Klamath River and the communities that depend upon it. In order to accomplish these objectives, KRRC must first obtain approval from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). For the three dams within California (the JC Boyle Dam is in Oregon), KRRC must also obtain the approval of the State Water Resources Control Board. RMM attorney Jim Moose is part of the team of attorneys assisting KRRC with the acquisition of the approvals needed for removal of the three facilities within California.

California Vegetation Treatment Program

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California Vegetation Treatment Program

The proposed CalVTP directs implementation of vegetation treatments on public and private land across the state as one component of the state’s efforts to reduce the risk of loss of lives and property, reduce fire suppression costs, and protect natural resources from wildfire. The California Board of Forestry and Fire Protection began analyzing the proposed program in early 2019 to consider and disclose the environmental effects of expanding CalFire’s vegetation treatment activities to cover a total of 250,000 acres per year (up from 33,000 acres per year on average in previous years) to help achieve the Governor’s goal of 500,000 annual acres of treatment on non-federal lands (Executive Order B-52-18). Vegetation treatments include wildland-urban interface fuel reduction, fuel breaks, and ecological restoration, through activities such as prescribed burning, mechanical and manual vegetation removal, prescribed grazing, and herbicides. RMM attorneys Jim Moose and Sabrina Teller advise the Board of Forestry regarding the preparation and certification of a Program EIR for the project.

Sierra Club v. County of Fresno

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In Sierra Club v. County of Fresno (2018) 6 Cal.5th 502, the California Supreme Court held that portions of the air quality analysis in Fresno County’s EIR for the 942-acre Friant Ranch Specific Plan violated CEQA. In reaching this decision, the Court made four important holdings:  (1) when reviewing whether an EIR’s discussion of environmental effects “is sufficient to satisfy CEQA,” the court must be satisfied that the EIR “includes sufficient detail to enable those who did not participate in its preparation to understand and consider meaningfully the issues the proposed project raises”; (2) an EIR must show a “reasonable effort to substantively connect a project’s air quality impacts to likely health consequences”; (3) “a lead agency may leave open the possibility of employing better mitigation efforts consistent with improvements in technology without being deemed to have impermissibly deferred mitigation measures”; and (4) “[a] lead agency may adopt mitigation measures that do not reduce the project’s adverse impacts to less than significant levels, so long as the agency can demonstrate in good faith that the measures will at least be partially effective at mitigating the Project’s impacts.”

The Friant Ranch project is a Specific Plan calling for approximately 2,500 age-restricted (ages 55+) residential units, and other uses, including a commercial center and a neighborhood electric vehicle network. Fresno County’s EIR for the project generally discussed the health effects of air pollutants such as Reactive Organic Gases (ROG), oxides of nitrogen (NOx), and particulate matter (PM), but without predicting any specific health-related impacts resulting from the project. The EIR found that the project’s long-term operational air quality effects were significant and unavoidable, even with implementation of all feasible mitigation measures. The EIR recommended a mitigation measure that included a “substitution clause,” allowing the County, over the course of project build-out, to allow the use of new control technologies equally or more effective than those listed in the adopted measure.

After the trial court denied Sierra Club’s petition for writ of mandate, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the EIR’s air quality analysis and air quality mitigation measures violated CEQA. The Supreme Court granted review of the appellate court’s decision. In a unanimous decision issued four years later, the Supreme Court reversed in part, and affirmed in part, the Court of Appeal’s decision.

The Court first considered which standard of judicial review applies to claims that an EIR’s discussion of environmental impacts is inadequate or insufficient. The Court explained that an EIR’s discussion of environmental impacts is adequate and sufficient where “the discussion sufficiently performs the function of facilitating ‘informed agency decisionmaking and informed public participation.” To that end, an EIR must “reasonably describe the nature and magnitude of the adverse effect.” The evaluation does not need to be exhaustive, but the courts will review the discussion “in light of what is reasonably feasible.” Claims that an EIR lacks analysis or omits the magnitude of the impact involve mixed questions of law and fact, and thus are generally reviewed de novo. The courts will apply the substantial evidence standard, however, to claims challenging the EIR’s underlying factual determinations, such as which methodologies to employ. “Thus, to the extent a mixed question requires a determination whether statutory criteria were satisfied, de novo review is appropriate; but to the extent factual questions predominate, a more deferential standard is warranted.”

The Court next considered whether the Friant Ranch EIR’s air quality analysis complied with CEQA. The Court held that an EIR must reflect “a reasonable effort to discuss relevant specifics regarding the connection between” and the estimated amount of a given pollutant the project will produce and the health impacts associated with that pollutant. Further, the EIR must show a “reasonable effort to put into a meaningful context” the conclusion that the project will cause a significant air quality impact. Although CEQA does not mandate an in-depth health risk assessment, CEQA does require an EIR to adequately explain either (a) how “bare [emissions] numbers” translate to or create potential adverse health impacts; or (b) what the agency does know, and why, given existing scientific constraints, it cannot translate potential health impacts further.

With respect to the Friant Ranch EIR, the EIR quantified how many tons per year the project will generate of ROG and NOx (both of which are ozone precursors), but did not quantify how much ozone these emissions will create. Although the EIR explained that ozone can cause health impacts at exposures for 0.10 to 0.40 parts per million, this information was meaningless because the EIR did not estimate how much ozone the Project will generate. Nor did the EIR disclose at what levels of exposure PM, carbon monoxide, and sulfur dioxide would trigger adverse health impacts. In short, the EIR made “it impossible for the public to translate the bare numbers provided into adverse health impacts or to understand why such translation is not possible at this time (and what limited translation is, in fact, possible).”

The Court noted that, on remand, one possible topic to address would be the impact the Project would have on the number of days of nonattainment of air quality standards per year, but the Court stopped short of stating such a discussion is required. Instead, the County, as lead agency, has discretion in choosing the type of analysis to supply.

The Court further held that the EIR did not fulfill CEQA’s disclosure requirements in that it stated that the air quality mitigation would “substantially reduce” air quality impacts but failed to “accurately reflect the net health effect of proposed air quality mitigation measures.”

Next, the Court examined whether the air quality mitigation measure impermissibly deferred formulation of mitigation because it allowed the County to substitute equally or more effective measures in the future as the Project builds out. The Court held that this substitution clause did not constitute impermissible deferral of mitigation because it allows for “additional and presumably better mitigation measures when they become available,” consistent with CEQA’s goal of promoting environmental protection. The Court also explained that mitigation measures need not include quantitative performance standards. If the mitigation measures are at least partially effective, they comply with CEQA; this is true even if the measures will not reduce the project’s significant impacts to less-than-significant levels.

RMM Partners Jim Moose and Tiffany Wright and Senior Associate Laura Harris represented the Real Party in Interest in the case.

Georgetown Preservation Society v. County of El Dorado

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In Georgetown Preservation Society v. County of El Dorado (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 358, the Third District Court of Appeal held that the lay opinions of local community members created a fair argument of potentially significant aesthetic impacts of a proposed retail store.

The project at issue was a proposed Dollar General store in a designated rural commercial zone in downtown Georgetown, an unincorporated community in El Dorado County. Although the community is not a designated historic resource, it has a historical design overlay zone, and new construction is required to “generally conform” to the county’s Historic Design Guidelines. The county prepared a mitigated negative declaration. The county also determined, through an extensive design review process in which the proposed design was extensively revised to more fully express the desired “Gold Rush Era” aesthetic, that the project was consistent with the County’s design guidelines, relying in part on peer review by experts in historic architecture. Over the course of the design and environmental review processes, local residents expressed their opinions that the project was visually incompatible with the existing aesthetic character of the community. Nonetheless, the county adopted the MND, and the Georgetown Preservation Society sued. The Society prevailed in the trial court, asserting that local residents’ lay opinions on the compatibility of the proposed store design with the existing aesthetic character of the town provided substantial evidence in support of a fair argument and that an EIR was required. The applicant and the county appealed.

First, the court held that the county’s determinations that the project complied with applicable planning and zoning rules via the historic design review process were not entitled to deference in the context of the county’s compliance with CEQA, and the fair argument standard still applies. Although an agency’s planning and design review forms part of the entire body of evidence to consider when determining whether the fair argument standard has been met, application of such design guidelines does not insulate the project from CEQA review at the initial study phase under the fair argument standard.

Second, the court stated that lay testimony can establish a fair argument that the project may cause substantial environmental impacts. The court rejected the appellants’ arguments that here, the county’s design review criteria recommending specific architectural styles and features constituted a technical subject. Therefore the court held that lay commentary on nontechnical matters is admissible and probative. Here, the court cited the large number of local residents who submitted comments on this issue, including some claiming backgrounds in design and planning.

Relatedly, the court held that the county’s position in litigation that cited evidence from lay persons was not credible, the county’s decision-makers were first obligated to state, in the record and with particularity, which evidence lacked credibility and why. The appellants asserted that much of the cited testimony lacked basis in facts, but the court held that the county could not discount such evidence in litigation after failing to do so in the administrative record. The court further stated that even if the county had made such determinations here, doing so would have been an abuse of discretion because the court found the testimony constituted substantial evidence supporting a fair argument.

The court noted that it was not offering an opinion as to whether the project would have a substantial impact on aesthetics, but only that an EIR was required in order to fully examine the issue.

RMM Partner Sabrina V. Teller represented the real party in interest/applicant.

High Sierra Rural Alliance v. County of Plumas

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In High Sierra Rural Alliance v. County of Plumas (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 102, the Third District Court of Appeal rejected arguments that Plumas County violated the Timberland Productivity Act (Timberland Act) and the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) when it adopted a general plan update, and affirmed the trial court’s judgment in the County’s favor. The opinion is the first precedent to explore the intersections of CEQA and the Timberland Act. It is also the first CEQA precedent clearly holding that a local government, in preparing an EIR for a general plan update, may base its impact analysis on reasonably foreseeable levels of population growth and development, as opposed to theoretically possible levels.

In 2005, the County began efforts to update its 1984 General Plan. Over the next eight years, the County engaged in a robust community engagement and education process to create the 2035 General Plan Update (GPU) that reflected the County’s planning goals and values. In December 2013, the County’s Board of Supervisors certified the Final Environmental Impact Report and adopted the GPU. High Sierra Rural Alliance filed suit, arguing that the GPU conflicted with the Timberland Act and that the EIR for the GPU did not adequately analyze impacts of potential growth outside of designated planning areas. The trial court disagreed and denied the petition and complaint in its entirety.

The Third District’s opinion began by contrasting the County’s large size with its small population. Although the County covers approximately 2,613 square miles or over 1.67 million acres, its vast lands supported only 20,007 residents in 2010. The court also highlighted the minimal expected population growth, with the Department of Finance estimating the County’s population to remain under 21,000 until 2025, at which point the population is expected to decline.

Turning to High Sierra’s Timberland Act claims, the opinion provides an overview of the Act and the GPU policies related to timberland production zone (TPZ) lands. The court settles a heretofore unresolved question under the Timberland Act–– namely, whether any residence approved on land zoned for timberland production must be “necessary for” the management of the relevant parcel as timberland. The court agreed with the County’s interpretation of Government Code section 51104, subdivision (h)(6), as providing that any “residence” on TPZ lands must be “necessary for” and “compatible with” the management of land zoned as timberland production. The court also made clear that “section 51104 suffices to supply the restrictions on residences and structures on timberland production zone parcels,” and thus the County’s GPU did not conflict with the Timberland Act simply because it failed to recite the statutory language in Section 51104 in its relevant policies.

In discussing the Timberland Act arguments, the court explained that “the finding [required by the Timberland Act] that a residence or structure is necessary for the management of a timberland production zoned parcel is not an exercise of discretion as used in the CEQA context.” The court provides local agencies and legal practitioners with important guidance on this issue by citing and quoting the discussion in the Friends of Westwood, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 259, 272, which provides that an agency can exercise CEQA discretion only where it has “the power (that is, the discretion) to stop or modify” a project in a “way which would mitigate the environmental damage in any significant way.” Because the court concluded that “the Timberland Act affords the County no discretion to stop or request modification of the proposed residence or structure in order to mitigate environmental impacts,” the court rejected High Sierra’s argument.

The court also rejected High Sierra’s CEQA claims. High Sierra argued that the EIR failed to acknowledge and analyze the potential for rural sprawl. But the EIR explained that full build-out under the GPU would not occur for another three hundred years. Based on the substantial evidence in the record, the court concluded that the County could properly focus its analysis on the reasonably foreseeable growth occurring under the GPU through year 2035. The court also agreed with the County that historic land use data supported the conclusion that growth would occur almost exclusively within the planning areas. The court rejected High Sierra’s speculation that one of the GPU policies would open the floodgates to residential subdivisions on agricultural, timber, and mining lands. High Sierra’s reliance on a working paper about real estate markets in the Northern Rockies failed to persuade the court because the paper did not cite any data specific to Plumas County.

Finally, the court held that the County did not violate CEQA by failing to recirculate the EIR. The court was unconvinced by High Sierra’s argument that the inclusion in the Final EIR of building intensity standards and more accurate maps showing potential development outside of planning areas triggered recirculation.

RMM Partner James G. Moose represented Plumas County.

Westsiders Opposed to Overdevelopment v. City of Los Angeles

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In Westsiders Opposed to Overdevelopment v. City of Los Angeles et al. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1079, the Second District Court of Appeal held that the City of Los Angeles did not misinterpret its City Charter when it amended its general plan to change the land use designation of a single parcel for a transit-oriented development project.

In 2015, Real Parties in Interest, Dana Martin, Jr., Philena Properties, L.P. and Philena Property Management, LLC (applicant) applied to develop a mixed-use, transit oriented development project on a five-acre site that was formerly a car dealership. The site was on a corner of a major intersection in West Los Angeles, less than 500 feet from a new light rail station. As part of its application, the applicant requested that the City change the site’s general plan land use designation from light industrial to general commercial, among other entitlements. The City prepared an EIR for the project and approved the project and the general plan amendment. A community group, Westsiders Opposed to Overdevelopment, sued, challenging the legality of the process followed by the City for amendment under the City Charter.

Los Angeles City Charter section 555 governs general plan amendments in the city. Relevant here, subdivision (a) allows the plan to be amended “by geographic areas, provided that the … area involved has significant social, economic or physical identity.” Subdivision (b) of that section states, in pertinent part, that “[t]he Council, the City Planning Commission or the Director of Planning may propose amendments to the General Plan.” Westsiders argued that both of these provisions prevented the City from approving the amendment in this case. Westsiders alleged that the general plan could not be amended for a single project or parcel because a single parcel did not qualify as a “geographic area” with “significant social, economic or physical identity” as required by section 555, subdivision (a). Westsiders also argued that, by requesting the general plan amendment, the applicant had effectively “initiated” the amendment in violation of section 555, subdivision (b), which restricts the authority to start that process to the council, planning commission, or planning director. The trial court denied the petition and found that the city did not exceed its authority under its charter in approving the amendment in this case. Westsiders appealed.

The court of appeal found that, because the challenge was to the city’s amendment of the general plan, Government Code section 65301.5 required that the city’s action be reviewed under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, governing traditional mandamus. In doing so, the court rejected Westsiders’ argument that, because the general plan amendment was for a single project and parcel, review should be under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, governing administrative mandamus. In discussing the appropriate standard of review, the court recognized that charter cities are presumed to have power over municipal affairs, and that any limitation or restriction on that power in the charter must be clear and explicit. The court also stated that, while construing the charter was a legal issue subject to de novo review, the city’s interpretation of its own charter is entitled to great weight unless it is clearly erroneous, and must be upheld if it has a reasonable basis.

In interpreting the charter, the court found that the plain meaning of the terms “geographic area” and “significant social, economic or physical identity” did not contain any clear and explicit limitation on the size or number of parcels involved in amending the general plan by geographic area. The court rejected Westsiders’ request for judicial notice, which contained several documents that Westsiders claimed were legislative history showing that the voters had intended to include such a limitation. The court also rejected Westsiders’ argument that, in considering whether a geographic area has “significant social, economic or physical identity” the city may not consider the proposed project and future uses of the site. The court found that the city’s determination that the site had significant economic and physical identity because it was one of the largest underutilized sites with close proximity to transit in West Los Angeles, and that the project would be the first major transit oriented development met the requirements of Charter section 555, subdivision (a). The court also pointed out that not every individual lot in the city would necessarily meet the requirements of the charter and qualify for a general plan amendment.

Interpreting Charter section 555, subdivision (b), the court rejected Westsiders’ argument that, by filling out a land use application requesting that the city amend the general plan, the applicant had improperly “initiated” the amendment in violation of the charter. Similar to its analysis of subdivision (a), the court found that section 555, subdivision (b) did not contain a clear and explicit limitation on who could request that the city amend the charter. The court also stated that city followed the procedures required by the charter because, after the applicant made its request, it was the planning director who formally initiated the amendment process.

Next, the court found that, because amending the general plan is a legislative act, the city was not required to make explicit findings to support its decision. The court rejected Westsiders’ argument that the city was required to make findings that “bridge the analytical gap between the raw evidence and ultimate decision” in this case (quoting Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 515). The court found that this requirement did not apply to legislative acts, such as the amendment of the general plan. The court also rejected Westsiders’ argument that the city’s use of the word “unique” in discussing the site’s identity (as opposed to “significant” used in the charter provision) made its “findings” inadequate. The court found that the city’s analysis showed that the site had significant economic and physical characteristics and met the requirements of section 555, subdivision (a).

Lastly, the court rejected Westsiders’ argument that the city impermissibly “spot-zoned” the project through the general plan amendment. The court found that Westsiders had failed to raise this argument in the trial court and was thus barred from raising it on appeal. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment dismissing the petition for writ of mandate.

RMM Partner Sabrina V. Teller and Associate Nathan O. George represented the respondent City of Los Angeles.

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