In Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles (2024) ___ Cal.App.5th ___, the Second District Court of Appeal held that the 90-day deadline for service of summons provided by the Subdivision Map Act (SMA) applied to CEQA claims challenging the sufficiency of mitigation measures adopted as conditions of approval of a vesting tentative map, but claims alleging violations of CEQA’s procedural requirements, which could not be brought under the SMA, were not subject to the SMA’s summons requirement.

Background

In 2018, a developer proposed to subdivide roughly 94 acres of open space in an unincorporated portion of the Santa Clarita Valley to develop 37 single-family homes, six public facilities, and two open space areas. To comply with CEQA, the County of Los Angeles prepared a mitigated negative declaration (MND) and a mitigation monitoring and reporting program (MMRP) for the Project.

On March 15, 2022, the County adopted the MND for the Project and conditionally approved a vesting tentative map and related permits for the Project. Among other things, the conditions of approval of the vesting tentative map required compliance with the MMRP.  The County filed a Notice of Determination on March 22, 2022.

On April 20, 2022, Petitioner Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the County’s approval of the Project. The Petition’s first cause of action alleged that the County violated CEQA, and a second cause of action alleged that the County violated the Planning and Zoning Law and the SMA. Petitioner did not obtain or serve a summons when it filed the Petition.

The developer filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Petitioner was required under the SMA to serve a summons within 90 days of the Project approvals but failed to do so. The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of the County and the developer on both causes of action. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the CEQA cause of action was not subject to the SMA’s summons requirement.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision

The Second District reversed the judgment with respect to the CEQA cause of action, finding that some, but not all, of the CEQA claims were barred under the SMA.

Initially, the court acknowledged the complexity of determining whether a CEQA challenge to a tentative or final map approval is subject to the SMA’s summons requirement. The court therefore cautioned that petitioners bringing such challenges “proceed at their peril if they fail to obtain and serve a summons within 90 days of the approval.”

The court held that Petitioner’s challenges to the adequacy of the mitigation measures in the MMRP were subject to the SMA’s summons requirement, which is set forth in Government Code section 66499.37. That section imposes a 90-day limitations period for filing a lawsuit and serving a summons, where a party challenges a legislative body’s decision “concerning a subdivision” or “the reasonableness, legality, or validity of any condition attached [to an approval of a subdivision], including, but not limited to, the approval of a tentative map.” Because the County required compliance with the MMRP as a condition of approval of the vesting tentative map for the Project, the court reasoned that Petitioner’s challenges to the adequacy of the mitigation measures necessarily concerned the “reasonableness” of a “condition attached [to an approval of a subdivision].” Accordingly, the court determined that those challenges were within the scope of the SMA.

By contrast, the court held that Petitioner’s claims alleging procedural CEQA violations were not within the scope of the SMA, and therefore not subject to the SMA’s summons requirement. In doing so, the court rejected the respondents’ argument that Government Code section 66499.37 applies to any challenge to a decision “concerning a subdivision.” Citing the statutory language, legislative history and intent, and relevant case law, the court explained that section 66499.37 only applies to challenges that could have been brought under the SMA or that overlap with an SMA claim. Because Petitioner’s procedural CEQA challenges were unique to CEQA and did not arise from or involve any controversy under the SMA, the court determined that those challenges were not subject to section 66499.37.

Accordingly, the court concluded that the trial court erred in granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings in its entirety. Acknowledging that a trial court may not grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to only part of a cause of action, the court reversed the judgment and directed the trial court to deny the motion as to the CEQA cause of action.

– Blaine R. Dyas

In Relevant Group, LLC v. Nourmand (9th Cir. 2024) 116 F.4th 917, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Defendants’ multiple CEQA challenges to Plaintiff’s proposed hotel projects were constitutionally protected under the First Amendment and therefore could not give rise to liability under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).

Background

Beginning in 2015, Plaintiffs proposed four hotel projects in the Hollywood neighborhood in the City of Los Angeles. Defendants opposed the projects during the City’s administrative approval process and in multiple CEQA lawsuits.

In June 2019, after the parties settled two CEQA lawsuits and while a third was underway, Plaintiffs filed a RICO lawsuit, alleging that Defendants had abused the CEQA process to extort Plaintiffs. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which a district court judge initially denied; however, the case was transferred to a new judge, who reversed the prior ruling and granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Plaintiffs appealed.

The Ninth Circuit’s Decision

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding Defendants’ multiple CEQA challenges were constitutionally protected and could not give rise to liability under RICO.

As an initial matter, the court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the district court abused its discretion by reconsidering the prior summary judgment ruling. While courts generally may not reconsider prior rulings by the same court in the same case, the court concluded that this case fell under an exception for situations in which the prior ruling was “clearly erroneous” and enforcement would result in a “manifest injustice.”

With respect to the merits, the court held that Defendants’ CEQA lawsuits were protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which generally protects parties exercising their right to petition from statutory liability. In so holding, the court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the Defendants’ CEQA lawsuits fell under the “sham litigation” exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.

The court considered two different tests for the sham litigation exception. The first stems from Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. (1993) 508 U.S. 49 (PREI). Under the two-step PREI test, the exception applies when a court first determines that a lawsuit is “objectively baseless,” then determines that the motive behind the lawsuit is improper. The second test, from USS-POSCO Industries v. Contra Costa County Building & Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 800 (POSCO), applies where a party files a “series” of lawsuits, without regards to their merits, for an unlawful purpose.

The court held that the two-step PREI test, rather than the POSCO test, applied to Defendants’ CEQA lawsuits. The court concluded that Defendants’ CEQA challenges to four of Plaintiffs’ hotel projects did not constitute a “series” of lawsuits for purposes of applying the POSCO test, explaining that POSCO itself involved twenty-nine lawsuits—a stark difference. The court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the CEQA challenges to the four projects were really comprised of twenty separate proceedings that brought them within the scope of POSCO, explaining that Plaintiffs’ proposed framework was inconsistent with the case law and would present “line-drawing” problems for future courts.

Applying the first step of the PREI test, the court concluded that Defendants’ CEQA lawsuits were not objectively baseless. Among other things, the court pointed out that Plaintiffs had settled two of the CEQA lawsuits—and that the terms of those settlements included environmental protections—and that a third CEQA lawsuit resulted in a court order directing the City to further consider one of the project’s environmental impacts. Moreover, the court explained that success in a CEQA lawsuit may come in many forms, and that many CEQA petitioners have a “low threshold” for success. Finally, the court emphasized that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is intended to prevent any “chilling effect” on the constitutional right to petition; thus, it acknowledged that courts should find that litigation is objectively baseless “only with great reluctance.” Given its conclusion that Defendants’ CEQA lawsuits were not objectively baseless, the court did not reach the second step of the PREI test.

Accordingly, the court determined that Defendants’ CEQA actions were protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and could not result in RICO liability.

– Adam D. Nir

In Save Our Capitol! v. Department of General Services (2024) ___ Cal.App.5th ___, the Third District Court of Appeal held that the Capitol Annex Project was statutorily exempt from CEQA pursuant to recent legislation.

Background

Pursuant to the State Capitol Building Annex Act of 2016 (Annex Act), the Joint Rules Committee and the Department of General Services (together, DGS) prepared and certified an EIR for the Capitol Annex Project. In its first published opinion regarding the Project, the Third District held that the EIR violated CEQA and directed the trial court to issue a peremptory writ of mandate.

After the first appeal, DGS prepared a revised EIR and reapproved the Project, and the trial court discharged the writ. In its second published opinion regarding the Project, the Third District held that the trial court prematurely discharged the writ before finding that the revised EIR complied with the writ.

In separate litigation alleging that the revised EIR did not comply with CEQA, the trial court upheld the revised EIR. Petitioner Save Our Capitol! appealed. While this third appeal was pending, the Legislature passed SB 174 to exempt the Project from further CEQA review and to make various appropriations related to the budget bill, effective immediately.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision

The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that SB 174 exempted the Project from CEQA’s requirements. As an initial matter, the court clarified that SB 174 did not moot the case. The court explained that SB 174 did not simply prevent the court from granting effective relief if it decided in favor of Petitioner; rather, SB 174 conclusively established that Petitioner was not entitled to any relief because it could not prevail on the merits.

In so holding, the court rejected Petitioner’s argument that SB 174 violated article IV, section 28 of the California Constitution, which prohibits the Legislature from appropriating funds for various types of alterations to the Capitol via urgency statute. While the court acknowledged some uncertainty about the scope of article IV, section 28, it explained that, regardless, SB 174 specifically prohibited the use of funds in any manner inconsistent with that provision. In response to Petitioner’s suggestion that DGS might nevertheless use the funds in a prohibited manner, the court pointed out that the suggestion merely indicated a hypothetical concern that DGS might violate SB 174 in the future; it did not indicate that SB 174 inherently violates article IV, section 28.

– Blaine R. Dyas

In California Natural Gas Vehicle Coalition v. State Air Resources Board (2024)___Cal.App.5th___, the Fifth District Court of Appeal upheld the State Air Resources Board’s (CARB) decision to not implement a low-Nitrous Oxide (low-NOx) vehicle credit within its Advanced Clean Trucks Regulation. The court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that CARB did not violate CEQA or the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in rejecting this proposed alternative.

Background

In 2018, CARB issued a notice of preparation regarding the Advanced Clean Trucks Regulation, which aimed to transition the class of medium- and heavy-duty trucks in California to zero-emission capable technology over time. Despite input urging for the inclusion of a low-NOx vehicle credit throughout multiple rounds of public comment, the suggested alternative was not considered and ultimately rejected in the Regulation’s Final EIR. CARB reasoned that this alternative ran counter to the goals of the Regulation, as promoting the sale of low-emitting vehicles would not advance the transition of the vehicle market to electric, zero-emission vehicles.

The California Natural Gas Vehicle Coalition, an association of companies and other interested parties that utilize natural gas (low-NOx fuel) technologies, filed a petition for writ of mandate alleging that CARB violated CEQA and the APA. Regarding CEQA, the Coalition alleged that the low-NOx vehicle credit was not sufficiently considered as an alternative or mitigation measure. It also argued that the EIR failed to consider a reasonable range of alternatives and did not adequately respond to public comments. The Coalition’s APA claim also revolved around the failure to consider a low-NOx vehicle credit alternative; however, it also contended that CARB’s economic impact analysis failed to consider the Regulation’s impact on those that invested in low-NOx technologies. The trial court denied the petition. The Coalition appealed.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision

CEQA

The Court of Appeal concluded that CARB’s decision not to discuss the low-NOx vehicle credit option as an alternative or mitigation measure was supported by substantial evidence.

CARB argued that a low-NOx alternative was not feasible as it undercut the regulation’s objective—encouraging the sale of lower-emitting vehicles subverted its goal of enhancing zero-emission vehicle sales. The Coalition, in contrast, asserted that the alternative was at least “potentially feasible,” and that CARB could not reject a project alternative merely because it did not meet one or several of the project’s goals. Rejecting the Coalition’s argument, the court found the alternative did not just fail to meet a single project goal; it ran counter to the Regulation’s underlying objective. As the court explained, CEQA allows agencies to reject alternatives that are infeasible or cannot achieve a project’s fundamental purpose. Here, as the goals of the Project and the low-NOx vehicle credit were contradictory, the alternative could be deemed “infeasible,” and thus, CARB was justified in rejecting it.

The Coalition also argued that the low-NOx option should have been considered as a mitigation measure because the Regulation would cause an increase in the use of electric vehicles—leading to short-term air quality impacts from increased manufacturing of these vehicles and the construction of new charging stations. The court ruled, however, that CARB was not required to look to mitigation measures that hampered its Regulation’s objectives. Because the vehicle credits were properly deemed infeasible as an alternative, CARB properly rejected them as a mitigation measure as well.

Finally, the Coalition alleged that CARB failed to respond to comments regarding the implementation of a low-NOx vehicle credit in the Final EIR. The court found, however, that CARB implemented the public’s suggestions into its analysis when it rejected the low-NOx vehicle credit option as an alternative. The court found that this was sufficient to “put the public on notice” that the comments were considered, and thus, the failure to directly respond was not prejudicial to public participation.

APA

The court also rejected the Coalition’s argument that CARB violated the APA. The Coalition first argued that CARB failed to consider the economic impact of the Regulation on businesses and individuals that have already adopted or invested in low-NOx emitting technologies. Under the APA, the economic impact assessment of a regulation must sufficiently cover all known cost impacts that California’s businesses and private individuals could incur by complying with the regulation. The Coalition argued that CARB’s analysis was too limited because those who invested heavily in low-NOx technologies would suffer from a regulation that encouraged the use of zero-emission vehicle technology but were not assessed as a group. The court disagreed, finding that this “group” was not impacted by the Regulation because they were not mandated by the Regulation to adopt and purchase zero-emission technologies, and therefore, did not need to be considered in the analysis. The court sided with CARB again regarding its rejection of the low-NOx vehicle credit as an alternative under the APA using similar reasoning to its CEQA analysis. The low-NOx vehicle credit alternative undercut the objectives of the Regulation and was therefore ineffective in implementing a zero-emission sales requirement.

– Adam Nir

In Westside Los Angeles Neighbors Network v. City of Los Angeles (2024) ___ Cal.App.5th ___, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision upholding an EIR and CEQA exemptions for several actions implementing the City of Los Angeles’ Westside Mobility Plan.

Background

The Westside Mobility Plan is a comprehensive study that was undertaken by the City of Los Angeles to develop potential short-term solutions and long-term plans addressing congestion and mobility challenges within that part of the city. In 2018, the city’s planning commission took actions to implement three of the six components of the Mobility Plan. These actions included (1) amendments to transportation impact assessment fee programs for two existing specific plans (Fee Program Updates); and (2) adoption of a Streetscape Plan setting guidelines and standards for streetscape elements such as street trees and landscaping, sidewalk paving, street lighting, and pedestrian crossings for the Mobility Plan area. While the Fee Program Updates and Streetscape Plan are largely separate, implementation of the Streetscape Plan could be funded through the transportation impact fees included in the Fee Program Updates.

The city prepared an EIR for the Fee Program Updates, which noted that the Mobility Plan’s other components, including the Streetscape Plan, were exempt from CEQA. The planning commission subsequently certified the EIR and also determined that the Fee Program Updates were statutorily and categorically exempt from CEQA.

The petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the planning commission’s authority to certify the EIR, the adequacy of the EIR, and the use of CEQA exemptions.  The trial court denied the petition. The petitioner appealed.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision

The Court of Appeal first considered whether the planning commission had authority to certify the EIR.  The petitioner argued that for a multi-component project like this, only the entity authorized to implement the component constituting the “primary source” of the project’s environmental impacts has the authority to certify the EIR, and that here, the primary source of the project’s impacts was the Fee Program Updates, which could only be approved by the City Council.  The court disagreed.

The court explained that under CEQA and the CEQA Gudelines, a non-elected decision-making body within a local agency (like the planning commission here) may certify an EIR. The court further found that, taken together, the applicable Guidelines establish that a “decision-making body” is any person or group of people within a public agency permitted by law to commit an agency to a definite course of action for a project. Accordingly, rather than asking whether the entity can implement the portion of the project constituting “the primary source” of the project’s environmental effects, as suggested by the petition, the relevant question is whether the entity at issue can make a decision that commits the agency to a definite course of action with respect to the whole project, even if the project is subject to multiple discretionary approvals.  Here, given the overlap between the Fee Program Updates and the Streetscape Plan, the court concluded that, by virtue of its power to adopt the Streetscape Plan, the planning commission could make a decision committing the City to a definite course of action in regard to the project (both the Fee Program Updates and the Streetscape Plan), even though further discretionary action by the City Council (i.e., adoption of the Fee Program Updates) was required to implement it.

The court next turned to the question of whether the Streetscape Plan falls within the scope of the Class 1 categorical exemption for minor alterations of existing facilities with negligible or no expansion of use. Answering in the affirmative, the court found that the Streetscape Plan, which includes standards for various streetscape elements, would result in only minor alterations to existing rights-of way that would improve aesthetics, functionality, and safety rather than expand their use.

The court rejected the petitioner’s contention that the Streetscape Plan did not meet the requirements of the Class 1 categorical exemption because the EIR and Statement of Overriding Considerations identified significant and unavoidable impacts related to the Fee Program Updates due to air quality, noise and vibration and transportation. The court explained that neither the EIR nor the city’s Statement of Overriding Considerations related to the improvements to be implemented as part of the Streetscape Plan, or more importantly, addressed whether the Streetscape Plan involved an expansion of use of an existing facility.

In relation to the EIR, the court observed that the petitioner appeared to be arguing that the EIR’s growth-inducing impact analysis was deficient because it failed to address concerns that the project would spur economic and population growth or directly or indirectly result in the construction of new housing raised in two comments received on the draft EIR. Despite the lack of clarity, the court nevertheless rejected the petitioner’s assertion. The court noted that the city addressed these concerns in the final EIR, concluding in responses to comments that the Fee Program Update would not induce growth. The court further noted that the petitioner had not raised any issues with the final EIR’s responses to the comments.

Finally, the petitioner argued that the EIR was insufficient because it failed to ensure how a neighborhood protection program, required as mitigation for the Fee Program Updates, would be funded. The court disagreed. The EIR specified that the program would be funded through fees obtained from the Fee Program Updates and the mitigation measure included specific thresholds that would trigger implementation of the program.

– Adam Nir

In Upland Community First v. City of Upland (2024) __Cal.App.5th__, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court order setting aside an MND for a warehouse project.  The Court of Appeal rejected the petitioner’s claims that impacts related to GHG emissions and traffic triggered the need for an EIR.

Background

The project, as initially proposed, included three warehouse buildings totaling 977,246 square feet located on a 50-acre parcel used for a rock and gravel crushing operation. In response to concerns that the project was too large, the applicant reduced the size to a single, one-level warehouse of 201,096 square feet.

The city prepared an MND for the project. The MND concluded that the project’s GHG emissions would be less than significant based on the South Coast Air Quality Management District’s 10,000 MTCO₂e/yr threshold for “heavy industrial stationary projects,” as well as a qualitative evaluation of the project’s consistency with the city’s general plan and climate action plan. In response to comments urging the city to use SCAQMD’s 3,000 MTCO₂e/yr threshold for mixed-use commercial/non-industrial projects, the project was revised to include sustainability features that reduced GHG emissions to below the 3,000 MTCO₂e/yr threshold. In connection with the project revisions, a supplemental GHG analysis was prepared using revised (increased) baseline emissions, which included the existing rock and gravel crushing activity on the project site. The revised GHG analysis concluded that the project would generate less than 3,000 MTCO₂e/yr.

The petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate alleging that an EIR was required because a fair argument could be made that the project would have significant impacts on traffic, transportation, air quality, and GHG emissions. The trial court granted the petition on the sole ground that substantial evidence failed to support the use of the 10,000 MTCO₂e/yr threshold. Additionally, the trial court found that even if the 3,000 MTCO₂e/yr had been applied, there was no explanation for the revised baseline used in the supplemental analysis.

The developer and the petitioner both appealed.

Court of Appeal’s Decision

Reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeal held that substantial evidence supported the city’s determination that the 3,000 MTCO₂e/yr was an appropriate numerical threshold for measuring the project’s GHG emissions. The court found that expert evidence explaining why the 10,000 MTCO₂e/yr threshold was inappropriate and urging the city to use instead the more stringent standard demonstrated a scientific and factual basis for use of the 3,000 MTCO₂e/yr threshold.

The court further held that the 3,000 MTCO₂e/yr threshold was an appropriate threshold for cumulative impacts resulting from a project’s GHG emissions. The court reasoned that in developing the 3,000 MTCO₂e/yr, SCAQMD relied on data collected by the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research, which shows that the 90 percent capture rate for commercial/mixed use commercial projects ranged from 1,390 to 1,481 MTCO₂e/yr.

As applied to this project, the court observed that the use of the 3,000 MTCO₂e/yr was conservative since the project is mixed-use commercial/industrial which would generally have higher GHG emissions compared to a mixed-use commercial/residential project.

Regarding the increase in baseline emissions used in the supplemental GHG analysis, the court agreed with the petitioner that the MND did not explain the reason for the increase in baseline emissions. The court nevertheless found that circumstantial evidence in the record showed that the increase was attributable to 78 truck trips used in the existing rock and gravel crushing operation that had not been included in the initial GHG analysis. The court therefore upheld the baseline emissions used in the supplemental GHG analysis.

Regarding the project’s traffic impacts, the petitioner argued that the MND’s analysis was inadequate because it underestimated the project’s daily passenger car equivalent (PCE) trips by using the incorrect trip generation rate classification. The court determined, however, that evidence in the record showed the project would not result in significant impacts using either classification.

The court also rejected the petitioner’s claim that the MND did not explain how delivery vans and truck trips were accounted for in the trip estimates. The court found that the trip generation rate classification used in the traffic analysis included delivery vans and truck traffic, and that additional discussion in the MND was not required.

Finally, the court held that the petitioner’s traffic claims related to congestion were moot given CEQA’s shift to using VMT as the metric for traffic impacts pursuant to CEQA Guidelines section 15064.3.

In Sunflower Alliance v. California Department of Conservation, the First District Court of Appeal found that conversion of a former oil well into an injection constituted a negligible expansion of use and upheld the agency’s factual determination that the project fell within the scope of the Class 1 categorical exemption for existing facilitates.

Background

The project at issue involves the conversion of a former oil well into an injection well. The project involves modest changes to the existing injection well site, including removal of a well plug, installation of injection equipment inside the well, with the same continued use of the existing well pad and access road. The injected water will be confined to the aquifer by a barrier of about 1,000 vertical feet of shale.

The project was reviewed by Department of Conservation’s Division of Geologic Energy Management (CalGEM), the State Water Resources Control Board, and the Regional Water Quality Control Board. As the lead agency, CalGEM found that the project fit within the Class 1 categorical exemption. According to CEQA Guidelines section 15301, Class 1 consists of “the operation, repair, maintenance, permitting, leasing, licensing, or minor alteration of existing public or private structures, facilities, mechanical equipment, or topographical features, involving negligible or no expansion of existing or former use.” CalGEM found that the injection equipment would be installed within the existing well boring and would require no significant surface equipment or new drilling and would further eliminate the need for routine trucking of produced water from the applicant’s active oil wells.

The petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging CalGEM’s determination that the project was categorically exempt from CEQA. The trial court granted the petition on grounds that injection, rather than extraction, constitutes a “significantly different use” and issued a writ directing CalGEM to set aside its approval of the project.

CalGEM complied with the writ, but the project applicant appealed.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision

The First District Court of Appeal reversed. The court considered whether well conversion projects, as a group, are beyond the scope of the Class 1 exemption. The petitioner argued that any new use of a modified well is an impermissible expansion. In contrast, the applicant argued that the applicability of the Class 1 exemption turns on the degree of change occurring as part of a project.

The court did not fully agree with either the petitioner or applicant. The court found that adopting petitioner’s approach would render the term “negligible” superfluous contrary to established principles of statutory interpretation. Instead, the court focused on the environmental consequences of a change in use to conclude that application of the Class 1 exemption is appropriate where the risk of environmental harm resulting from a change in use is negligible. The court also noted this interpretation aligns with the fundamental purpose of categorical exemptions, which is to exclude from CEQA review certain classes of projects that have been determined to not have significant environmental impacts.

As applied here, the court found that the project fell within the scope of the Class 1 categorical exemption. The court reasoned that not only does the project involve only minor alteration to existing equipment, but also that the environmental risks of the conversion are negligible because the project’s approval includes a regulatory determination ensuring that the injected water cannot escape the underlying aquifer and harm people, property, or the environment.

The court found petitioner’s claims regarding environmental impacts were unsupported by substantial evidence and speculative. The court similarly rejected the petitioner’s claim that CalGEM’s request for additional technical information regarding migration of injected water as part of its review was evidence of a potentially significant environmental effect. The court noted that based on additional analysis and a requirement to conduct testing to confirm that analysis, any concerns regarding impacts to water quality had been resolved.

Finally, the petitioner argued that imposition of mitigation measures to eliminate the project’s alleged environmental impacts precluded use of the Class 1 categorical exemption. The court disagreed, finding that although numerous special conditions had been imposed as part of the project approval, the conditions were standards required for issuance of the permit, and therefore were not appropriately construed as CEQA mitigation measures.

– Hannah Rider