Author Archives: Bridget McDonald

EPA ANNOUNCES FINAL CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 401 WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION IMPROVEMENT RULE

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In another “Waters of the United States” development, the EPA published its final 2023 Clean Water Act Section 401 Quarter Quality Certification Improvement Rule on September 27, 2023. (88 Fed. Reg. 66558.) The final 2023 Rule revises and replaces the 2020 Rule’s regulatory requirements for water quality certification that were adopted by the prior federal administration. The updates seek to realign the scope of Section 401 certification with established practices, while also restoring the roles of states, territories, and authorized Tribes as certifying agencies.

Background on Section 401 Permitting

Section 401 of the Clean Water Act (CWA) requires applicants for any federal license or permit that may result in discharge from a point source into “waters of the United States” to obtain a water quality certification or waiver from the certifying authority (i.e., states, territories, and Tribes with treatment in a similar manner as a state [TAS]). To initiate the process, the applicant must submit a “request for certification,” and the certifying authority must act upon that request within a “reasonable period of time” (which shall not exceed one year).

If the certifying authority determines the proposed activity will comply with statutory limitations and requirements (i.e., effluent limits; monitoring and reporting; etc.), it may grant or waive certification, after which the federal agency can issue the corresponding federal license/permit. If the certifying authority denies certification, no license may be issued. Alternatively, the certifying authority may waive certification simply by “failing or refusing to act on a request for certification within a reasonable period of time.”

The 2020 Rule

On April 15, 2019, then-President Trump issued Executive Order 13868, entitled “Promoting Energy Infrastructure and Economic Growth,” which directed the EPA to propose new regulations governing Section 401 permitting consistent with the order’s policy of “promot[ing] private investment in the Nation’s energy infrastructure.” Pursuant to this directive, EPA promulgated a final rule on July 13, 2020.

The 2020 Rule clarified that federal agencies unilaterally set the “reasonable period of time” for the certifying authority to act on a certification request, clarified that certification was required for any federally licensed activity that discharges into WOTUS, and reaffirmed that certifying authorities may explicitly waive 401 certification. The 2020 Rule also introduced several new features, including one that allowed federal agencies to review certifying agencies’ certification decisions for compliance and, if found non-compliant, deem the non-complying certifications as waived. The 2020 Rule also prohibited certifying agencies from requesting applicants to withdraw and resubmit a certification request. Finally, the 2020 Rule rejected the traditional scope of review as one that considered “the activity as a whole,” in favor of a narrower and more limited “discharge-only” approach.

The 2020 Rule was challenged in three federal district courts by various states, tribes, and NGOs, where, at varying times, it was remanded, reinstated, and ultimately vacated for further proceedings. (E.g., In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking (N.D. Cal. 2021) 568 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (reversed and remanded by (9th Cir. 2023) 60 F.4th 583.)

2023 Rulemaking Process

On January 20, 2021, President Biden signed Executive Order 13990, entitled “Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis.” (86 Fed. Reg. 7037.) The order directed the EPA to review and, as appropriate, revise or replace any or all portions of the 2020 Clean Water Action (CWA) Section 401 Certification Rule that had been adopted by the Trump administration.

On May 27, 2021, the EPA announced its intent to revise the 2020 Rule and update the regulatory requirements for water quality certification under Section 401. The EPA later circulated the proposed rule on June 2, 2022, which updated existing regulations to be more consistent with the statutory text of the CWA and to clarify elements of the Section 401 certification process, particularly as it applied to state, federal, and Tribal authority. Thereafter, the EPA conducted pre-proposal engagement and provided a 60-day public comment period.

After receiving public comments and incorporating stakeholder feedback, the EPA published the final Section 401 Rule on September 27, 2023. The rule will become effective on November 27, 2023, and apply to all Section 401 permit applications from then on.

The 2023 Rule Update

The updated 2023 Rule aims to enhance certification review and provide more regulatory certainty that better reflects the CWA’s cooperative federalism framework. The 2023 Rule makes key updates to five major areas of the certification process, including: pre-filing meeting requests; requests for certification; the length of “reasonable period of time”; scope of review; and certification decisions. The Rule also clarifies provisions related to: federal agency review; neighboring jurisdictions; certification modifications; and Tribal TAS status.

Pre-Filing Meeting Requests (Section 121.4)
The 2023 Rule reaffirms that project proponents must request a pre-filing meeting from the certifying agency at least 30 days before it requests certification. (Section 121.4).

As part of the update, the 2023 Rule now provides certifying authorities with the ability to waive or shorten the pre-filing meeting request requirement either on a case-by-case basis (i.e., individual) or on a categorical basis (i.e., for certain types of projects, permits, etc.). The Rule also provides a recommended list of pre-filing meeting request contents to ensure any issues are timely addressed and the certification process moves efficiently.

Requests for Certification (Section 121.5)
The 2023 Rule updates the submission requirements for requests for certification. (Section 121.5). Now, requests for certification must be in writing, signed, date, and include defined minimum contents. For example, if the certification request is for an individual license/permit, it must include a copy of the federal license/permit application and any readily available water-quality materials that informed the application. Alternatively, if the certification request is for a general license/permit, then it must include a copy of the draft federal license/permit and any available water quality-related materials that informed the draft permit.

Moreover, if the EPA is acting as the certifying authority, the Rule sets forth seven additional components that the project proponent must submit. To this end, the Rule now allows state and Tribal certifying authorities to define their own contents or forms for submitting requests for certification, in lieu of relying on EPA’s default list. But if they choose not to do so, the seven elements contained in the Rule’s default list must be included in the request.

Finally, the 2023 Rule now requires certifying authorities to send written confirmation of the date it received a request for certification to the project proponent and the corresponding federal agency.

Reasonable Period of Time (Section 121.6)
Section 121.6 requires certifying agencies to review certification requests and act on those requests within a “reasonable period of time.” (Section 121.6.)  For the first time, the 2023 Rule now provides certifying authorities a role in determining, with the federal agency, the length of the “reasonable period of time” for the certifying authority to review a certification request. Certifying authorities may collaborate with federal licensing or permitting agencies to jointly establish reasonable periods of time before receiving a request. For example, time periods may be established on a case-by-case basis, or on a categorical basis (i.e., through a memorandum of agreement between the federal and certifying agencies).

If the certifying and federal agencies do not reach an agreement, the “reasonable period of time” will default to six months from the time the certifying authority receives a compliant certification request.

In the event the certifying authority needs more time to comply with its public notice procedures or if there is a force majeure event, the agency may, subject to proper notice, automatically extend the review period, provided that the extension does not exceed the statutory maximum of one year.

Scope of Review (Section 121.3)
The 2023 Rule realigns certification processes with previously-established practices that preceded the 2020 Rule. In particular, the Rule modifies the regulatory text to better clarify the extent of the activity subject to certification and the water quality limitations inherent to Section 401.

Under the 2020 Rule, certifying authorities could only consider potential water quality impacts from a proposed project’s point source “discharges.” The 2023 Rule replaces this “discharge-only” approach and returns the scope of review to the “whole activity” that will be subject to the federal permit. Specifically, the Rule provides that, when a certifying authority reviews a certification request, the authority shall evaluate whether the activity complies with all water quality requirements.

However, the Rule clarifies that this evaluation is limited only to those water-quality-related impacts from the activity subject to the federal permit, including the activity’s construction and operation (i.e., impacts that adversely affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of WOTUS). Therefore, indirect project impacts with no connection to water quality should not be considered.

To this end, the 2023 Rule also clarifies that the certifying authority’s review is limited to considering impacts to WOTUS, except where a state or authorized Tribe has jurisdiction over those waters. In other words, the certifying authority’s analysis of any given activity is limited to adverse water-quality impacts that may prevent compliance with applicable state or Tribal water quality requirements.

Finally, in granting the certification, the certifying authority must include any requisite conditions that will ensure the activity complies with all applicable water quality requirements (e.g., Sections 301, 302, 303, 306, and 307, and/or any applicable state or Tribal statutes and regulations governing water quality). As such, any conditions that are imposed to address impacts should not be treated as part of the “activity” under consideration.

Certification Decisions (Section 121.7)
The 2023 Rule also establishes that a certifying agency may “act on a request for certification” in one of four ways: (1) by granting certification; (2) by granting certification with conditions; (3) denying certification; or (4) expressly waiving certification. The Rule also requires all final certification decisions be in writing and defines recommended minimum contents for each type of decision.

For example, the Rule recommends that each decision identify the type of decision being made, the applicable federal license/permit, acknowledgement that the certifying agency complied with public noticing procedures. For certifications granted with conditions, the Rule recommends the authority provide a statement explaining why each condition is necessary to assure the activity will comply with water quality requirements. Alternatively, for denials, the Rule recommends the authority explain why it is unable to certify compliance with water quality requirements.

Federal Agency Review (Sections 121.8–121.9)
The 2023 Rule shifts away from the 2020 Rule by limiting the role of federal agency review. Now, federal agencies are limited to verifying: (1) whether the certifying authority issued a certification decision; (2) the authority confirmed it complied with public noticing procedures; and (3) the authority acted on the request within a reasonable period of time.

Neighboring Jurisdictions (Sections 121.12–121.15)
The 2023 Rule adds more detail to the discussion of neighboring jurisdictions and how they can participate in the permitting process when the EPA has determined that a proposed project in another jurisdiction may affect their water quality. The regulatory text now clarifies: the roles of actors involved; when the neighboring jurisdiction process begins; and identifying minimum contents of notifying the EPA.

Certification Modifications (Section 121.10)
The 2023 Rule authorizes certifying authorities and federal agencies to modify a grant of certification, but only if the modifications are to portions that are agreed upon by both entities. The Rule clarifies that the certifying authority cannot unilaterally modify a certification decision, nor can it change the nature of the final decision through the modification process (i.e., grant, deny, waive).

Tribes Applying for Treatment in a Similar Manner as a State (Section 121.11)
For the first time, the 2023 Rule includes provisions for Tribes to obtain TAS status for purposes of Section 401 certification or to obtain TAS status to act as a neighboring jurisdiction. This will not allow tribes to have more involvement in the certification process without also having to apply for TAS for water quality standards under Section 303(c).

Conclusion

The Final 2023 Rule will go into effect on November 27, 2023 and apply to all prospective certification decisions. All other certifications currently pending review or submitted before then will be governed by the 2020 Rule or corresponding certification scheme.

For more information, the EPA has provided an overview of the final rule, along with a summary of key updates and a comparison of the 2023 Rule vs. the 2020 Rule. The Agency is also finalizing conforming amendments to the water quality certification regulations for EPA-issued NPDES permits. (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OW-2022-0128; -0391).

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Brian Plant, Of Counsel Attorney at RMM, advises private and public agency clients regarding a broad range of permitting actions under Federal and State water quality, endangered species, and other natural resources laws and regulations. He can be reached at: [email protected].

Bridget McDonald, Associate Attorney at RMM, advises private and public agency clients regarding a broad range of permitting actions under Federal and State water quality laws, as well as CEQA, the Coastal Act, and matters related to planning, zoning, and housing. She can be reached at: [email protected].

EPA PUBLISHES REVISED DEFINITION OF “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES” IN RESPONSE TO SCOTUS’ SACKETT DECISION.

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On August 29, 2023, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of the Army (Army) issued a final rule to amend the agencies’ earlier “Revised Definition of ‘Waters of the United States,’” published on January 18, 2023. (88 Fed. Reg. 3004.) The latest rule revises the definition of “waters of the United States” (WOTUS) to conform to the Supreme Court’s May 25, 2023 opinion in Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency (2023) 598 U.S. 651.

The highly anticipated Sackett decision resolved long-standing debate over the scope and definition of WOTUS under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The Court’s opinion considerably narrows the regulatory reach of the EPA and the Army by invalidating the agencies’ application of the “significant nexus” test and promulgating a limited interpretation of jurisdictional “waters” and “adjacent wetlands” that are covered by the CWA.

While the EPA and Army’s January 2023 WOTUS Rule was not directly before the Supreme Court, the Sackett decision made clear that certain aspects of the that Rule were invalid, in turn creating further uncertainty for CWA implementation. The August 2023 Rule (also referred to as “the Conforming Rule”) thus responds to Sackett by amending only those components of the rule’s regulatory text that are now invalid under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the CWA—namely, removing the “significant nexus” standard and amending the definition of “adjacent” waters. By expeditiously issuing these amendments, the agencies assert the final rule provides much-needed clarity and a clear path forward that is not only consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling, but allows the Army Corps to resume issuing jurisdictional determinations (which have been put on hold in some Corps’ Districts).

A summary of the August 2023 Rule’s key amendments and its timeline for implementation are summarized below:

Key Regulatory Amendments

To align with the Sackett holding, the August 2023 Rule takes a surgical approach to make targeted revisions to selected portions of the January 2023 Rule that are implicated by the decision:

Removal of “Significant Nexus” Standard
The Sackett decision found that the agencies’ application of the “significant nexus” test to identify federally protected tributaries and other waters was inconsistent with the text and structure of the CWA. The August 2023 Rule thus removes all references to the standard.

As a result, tributaries, adjacent wetlands, and intrastate lakes and ponds that “significantly affect the chemical, physical, or biological integrity of [traditional navigable] waters” are no longer jurisdictional under the CWA. Along these lines, the Conforming Rule also eliminates the definition of “significantly affect,” which listed various factors and conditions that the agencies used to ascertain whether certain waters would have a material influence on the chemical, physical, or biological integrity of traditional navigable waters. These standards, according to the Court, were too nebulous for reasonable and understandable implementation and were inconsistent with the structure of the Clean Water Act.

Amended Definition of “Adjacent” Waters
To conform to Sackett, the August 2023 Rule also amends the WOTUS definition so that water can no longer be found “jurisdictional” based on the January 2023 Rule’s definition of “adjacent.” As such, wetlands are not “adjacent,” and thus, not jurisdictional under the CWA, solely because they are “bordering, contiguous, or neighboring…[or] separated from other ‘waters of the United States’ by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes, and the like.”

Instead, “adjacent” tributaries, wetlands, and intrastate lakes/ponds are only jurisdictional if they are “relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies of water,” or have a continuous surface connection to navigable waters.

No More “Interstate Wetlands,” But Little Clarity on “Relatively Permanent” Wetlands
With the elimination of the “significant nexus” standard, tributaries, wetlands, and intrastate lakes/ponds that are “adjacent” to federal navigable waters are only jurisdictional if they are “relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies of water.” The August 2023 Rule also eliminates “interstate wetlands” from the definition of “interstate waters” that are subject to the CWA.

Notably, however, the August 2023 Rule provides little clarity into the factors that create “relatively permanent” waters. The Rule’s supplemental preamble explains that, under Rapanos, those waters do “not necessarily exclude streams, rivers, or lakes that might dry up in extraordinary circumstances such as drought,” or “seasonal rivers, which contain continuous flow during some months of the year but no flow during dry months.”

And, under Sackett, “waters”  encompass “only those relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies of water forming geographical features that are described in ordinary parlance as streams, oceans, rivers, and lakes.” Wetlands are  WOTUS “when they have a continuous surface connection to bodies that are ‘waters of the United States’in their own right, so that there is no clear demarcation between ‘waters’ and wetlands.’” Nevertheless, under the Conforming Rule, it remains unclear the length of “relative permanency” a water must experience in order to qualify as jurisdictional under the CWA.

Finally, the August 2023 Rule removes “interstate wetlands” to conform to the Sackett decision’s determination that wetlands are not jurisdictional simply because they are interstate. Instead, under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the CWA, the term “waters” refers to such ‘open waters’ such as rivers, lakes, and other waters that flow across or form a part of State boundaries.

Regulatory Interpretation & Agency Guidance
Unlike prior versions of the WOTUS rule, the August 2023 Rule’s proposed amendments note that the agencies will continue to interpret the remainder of the definition of WOTUS in a manner that is consistent with the Sackett decision. But the agencies reiterate that it is both reasonable and appropriate for the agencies to promulgate this rule as quickly as feasible, without notice and comment, in response to the Supreme Court’s significant holding.

In turn, the agencies concede that they will address any potential issues arising from implementation of the August 2023 Rule through appropriate avenues, such as approved jurisdictional determinations and CWA permits, issuing future guidance, subsequent notice and comment rulemaking, preparing agency forms and training materials, and holding stakeholder meetings to ensure the public has an opportunity to provide input on other issues they would like the agencies to address.

Thus, in practice, the agencies will develop guidance and take stakeholder input regarding the August 2023 Rule’s proposed amendments after it is published in the Federal Register and becomes effective, and not rely on pre-publication comment.

Severability Clause
As with the agencies’ January 2023 Rule, the August 2023 Rule similarly provides a severability clause that attempts to preserve as many portions as feasible in the event future litigation attempts to stay or invalidate the Rule. The August 2023 Rule reiterates that the WOTUS rule was crafted so that each portion or element is disjunctive and capable of operating independently. Therefore, if any provision is deemed legally invalid, that partial invalidation will not render the remainder of the Rule as also invalid. To this end, if applying any portion of the Conforming Rule is determined to be invalid, the agencies intend that the complete WOTUS rule, as revised, will remain applicable to all other circumstances. In other words, if any of the exclusions from WOTUS were deemed invalid, invalidating one exclusion would not necessarily have any practical impact on any other part of the definition of WOTUS.

Implementation Timeline

No Notice and Public Comment Process
Because the proposed amendments are change only those parts of the January 2023 rule that are invalid under Sackett, the EPA and the Army have decided to issue the August 2023 Rule without notice or an opportunity for public comment. Citing section 553(b)(B) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the agencies have found there is good cause that providing noticing or receiving public comments on the final rule would be impracticable and unnecessary.

According to the agencies, the conforming amendments “do not involve the exercise of the agencies’ discretion,” therefore a “notice and comment process would neither provide new information to the public nor inform any agency decisionmaking regarding the aspects of the regulations defining ‘waters of the United States’ that are invalid as inconsistent with the [CWA] under Sackett.”

Immediate Publication & Effect
The August 2023 Rule will become immediately effective upon publication in the Federal Register. The agencies have found similar good cause under APA section 553(d)(3) to make the August 2023 Rule immediately effective because it will not impose any burdens on the regulated community. Instead, the agencies contend that the amendments merely conform the January 2023 Rule to Sacket by amending those provisions deemed invalid under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the CWA.

The agencies reiterate that making the rule immediately effective will provide more clarity and certainty to the regulated community; whereas a delayed effective date would prolong confusion and potentially result in project delays for prospective permittees that seek a jurisdictional determination for their project’s proposed discharges. Finally, the immediate effect of the Conforming Rule will also provide clarity to States and Tribes that administer CWA permitting programs, as well as members of the general public who seek to understand which waters are subject to the CWA’s requirements.

Next Steps

The amended August 2023 Rule is expected to be published in the Federal Register by Friday, September 1, 2023. Once published, the rule will go into immediate effect and the Army Corps’ pause on issuing jurisdictional determinations (due to the pending Sackett decision) will be lifted.

Due to an existing injunction against the January 2023 Rule, the agencies will implement the August 2023 Rule in the 23 states where the January 2023 Rule is not enjoined. In the remaining 27 states where the January 2023 is enjoined, the agencies will continue interpreting WOTUS consistent with the pre-2015 regulatory regime and the Sackett framework until further notice.

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Brian Plant, Of Counsel attorney at RMM, advises private and public agency clients regarding a broad range of permitting actions under Federal and State water quality, endangered species, and other natural resources laws and regulations. He can be reached at: [email protected].

U.S. SUPREME COURT LIMITS FEDERAL PERMITTING JURISDICTION UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT, HOLDING THAT ONLY WETLANDS WITH A SURFACE CONNECTION TO INTERSTATE NAVIGABLE WATERS CONSTITUTE “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES.”

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SUMMARY AND UPDATE

In a highly-anticipated decision published on May 25, 2023, the United Stated Supreme Court in Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency (2023) 598 U.S. __, 143 S.Ct. 1322 (No. 21-454), resolved the long-standing debate over the definition and scope of “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act. The unanimous opinion authored by Justice Alito significantly narrows the jurisdictional reach of the EPA and Army Corps by adopting the Court’s earlier plurality opinion in Rapanos v. U.S. to hold that only those wetlands with geographical features that are “indistinguishable” from traditional navigable waters due to a continuous surface connection are subject to federal regulation under the Clean Water Act. The Court applied this new standard to conclude that the EPA lacked regulatory and permitting authority over wetlands located adjacent to land owned by petitioners Michael and Chantell Sackett because those wetlands were distinguishable from covered waters.

Factual & Procedural Background

In 2004, Petitioners Michael and Chantell Sackett (the Sacketts) began backfilling land on their property near Priest Lake, Idaho, across the street from a tributary that feeds a non-navigable creek. While the parcel does not share a “continuous surface connection” with the tributary, the land could, at times, be hydrologically connected to the tributary and, by extension, Priest Lake.

After an enforcement action brought by EPA and after nearly a decade of litigation, the District Court entered summary judgment in favor of the EPA, holding that the Sacketts’ land was subject to CWA protections. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the CWA covers adjacent wetlands with a significant nexus to traditional navigable waters and that the Sacketts’ lot satisfied that standard.

The Supreme Court’s Opinion

The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the proper test for determining whether the wetlands on the Sacketts’ property constituted “waters of the United States” under the CWA.

The Court’s Holding – Defining “Waters of the United States”

Against the backdrop of a much litigated CWA history regarding jurisdiction, and relying heavily on earlier Supreme Court decisions (i.e., Rapanos), the 9-0 majority in Sackett held that the CWA’s use of the term “waters” in “waters of the United States” refers only to “those relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies of water ‘forming geographical features’ that are described in ordinary parlance as ‘streams, oceans, rivers, and lakes.’” As such, adjacent wetlands only constitute statutory “waters of the United States” if they are “indistinguishable” from those bodies of water due to a continuous surface connection.

The Court agreed with the plurality in Rapanos that wetlands subject to the CWA include those that are “indistinguishable” from bodies of water that traditionally constitute “waters of the United States.” This only occurs when wetlands have “a continuous surface connection” to bodies of WOTUS, such that there is “no clear demarcation between ‘waters’ and ‘wetlands.’” Accordingly, to assert jurisdiction over an adjacent wetland under the CWA, a party must establish that: (1) “the adjacent body of water constitutes [WOTUS] (i.e., a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters)”; and (2) “the wetland has a continuous surface connection with … a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters,” such that it is “difficult to determine where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.”

In articulating this bright-line rule, the Court declined to defer to the EPA’s 2023 “wetlands” rule, which provides that “adjacent wetlands are covered by the CWA if they possess a significant nexus to traditional navigable waters, [and] that wetlands are ‘adjacent’ when they are ‘neighboring’ to covered waters.” The Court, in part, relied heavily on the thought that the assertion of jurisdiction should be clear so that those regulated can determine if their actions trigger the need for federal permitting and whether proposed “fill” activities can be subject to federal criminal enforcement.  In so doing, the Court relied on dictionary definitions and reasoned that the EPA’s earlier regulatory interpretations were inconsistent with the text of the CWA because the Act contained no “exceedingly clear language” indicating Congress’ intent.

Despite the Court’s focus on the need for clear language, the opinion provides that “[the Court] also acknowledge that temporary interruptions in surface connection may sometimes occur because of phenomena like low tides or dry spells.”  Here the Court raises a question with respect to what amounts to a “continuous” surface connection during drought, for instance.  Indeed, how “dry” is “dry” and how long does a feature need to be “dry” before it is no longer a “temporary” interruption of flow.

Recent Updates

Both EPA and the Corps have gone on record in saying that they anticipate issuing a federal rule addressing the Court’s opinion in September 2023. In addition, various Corps Districts are modifying procedures in anticipation of this proposed rule and/or guidance. For instance, the Sacramento District has suspended processing Approved Jurisdictional Determinations (AJDs) and will verify only Preliminary Jurisdictional Determinations (PJDs).

Numerous NGOs, policy groups and agencies are attempting to determine the impact of the ruling on their programs. For instance, the National Association of Homebuilders (NAHB) has conducted talks with aquatic resource consultants and scientists in an effort to determine the likely effect of future regulation and permitting. That input generally recognizes that “one size” will likely “not fit all” given the wide variety of regional wetland hydrology. In particular, regions with “ephemeral” Mediterranean climates like California will be affected differently than those with consistently wetter climates.

Brian Plant, of counsel attorney at RMM, advises private and public agency clients regarding a broad range of permitting actions arising under Federal and State water quality, endangered species, and other natural resources laws and regulations. He can be reached at [email protected].

SECOND DISTRICT FINDS QUANTIFICATION OF EXISTING WATER RIGHTS NOT REQUIRED UNDER CEQA FOR WATER DIVERSION AND STORAGE PROJECT

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On March 3, 2022, the Second District Court of Appeal ordered published its decision in Buena Vista Water Storage District v. Kern Water Bank Authority (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 576, in which the court held that an EIR for a project to divert and store unappropriated flood flows need not quantify all existing water rights. The court also held that CEQA does not require the project description to specify the exact amount of water that would be diverted, since that amount will vary from year to year based on the weather. Additionally, the court held that substantial evidence supported the EIR’s conclusion that the project would not adversely affect the long-term recovery of the groundwater basin in which it is located, as the project would cause a net benefit to the aquifer.

Factual & Procedural Background

Although the Kern River had been designated a fully appropriated stream for many years—such that only those who held an appropriative right could divert from it—in 2010, the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) found that in certain wet years, Kern River water was available in excess of the amount appropriated. In particular, following construction of the Kern River-California Aqueduct Intertie in 1977, the Kern River water master began occasionally releasing reservoir water into the intertie to alleviate flooding. This release only occurs when flows are in excess of those held by existing water rights holders. The SWRCB concluded that this flood-released water was unappropriated and stated that it would allow applications to appropriate that water.

Respondent, the Kern Water Bank Authority, thereafter filed an application with the SWRCB seeking a permit for a water right to divert and store up to 500,000 acre-feet-per-year of the unappropriated water. The Authority also certified an EIR for the project. Buena Vista Water Storage District filed a petition for writ of mandate, seeking to set aside the Authority’s certification of the EIR and its approval of the project.

The trial court granted Buena Vista Water Storage District’s writ petition, holding: (1) the EIR’s project description was inadequate because it did not quantify existing water rights and it was unstable; (2) the EIR’s discussion of the existing baseline was inadequate because it did not quantify competing existing rights to Kern River water; and (3) the EIR’s impact analysis was inadequate because it did not adequately assess impacts on senior rights holders and impacts on groundwater during long-term recovery operations. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the EIR complied with CEQA.

The Court of Appeal’s Opinion

The EIR’s Project Description is Accurate and Stable

Unlike the trial court, the Second District Court of Appeal held that the EIR’s project description is adequate under CEQA. As explained by the court, the EIR consistently and adequately describes the project as “‘high flow Kern River water, only available under certain hydrologic conditions and after the rights of senior Kern River water right holders have been met, that otherwise would have (1) been diverted to the Intertie, (2) flooded farmlands, or (3) left Kern County.’”

Buena Vista Water Storage District argued that the EIR’s project description is unstable because it relies on an “open-ended limit of ‘up to 500,000 [acre-feet] of water.” The court rejected this argument, explaining that a precise amount of water to be diverted by the project cannot be determined because water availability will fluctuate from year to year. As stated by the court: “A project description may use a flexible parameter when subject to future changing conditions.” Furthermore, the proposed 500,000 acre-foot-per-year is a finite maximum amount based on historical conditions, thus providing an adequate upper-end of the proposed diversion.

EIR Not Required to Quantify Existing Water Rights

The appellate court also rejected the District’s contention that the EIR’s project description must include a quantification of existing Kern River rights. That amount of detail is not necessary under CEQA Guidelines section 15124, subdivision (c), which requires a “general description” of the project’s technical and environmental characteristics. Moreover, a stream-wide quantification is a complex proceeding conducted by the SWRCB or a court and can take several years (or even decades) to complete. CEQA does not require this type of exhaustive detail.

Similarly, the EIR’s description of the existing environmental setting is not required to include a quantification of the existing Kern River water rights. The EIR satisfies CEQA’s informational requirements by providing measurements of Kern River water historically diverted into the Kern Water Basin and estimating, based on these historic records, how much water the Kern River Bank Authority could have diverted from the basin under baseline conditions. A complete quantification of existing water rights was not necessary to provide these estimates.

Finally, the court found it was clear that existing rights would not be impacted because the SWRCB cannot issue a new permit to divert water that is already subject to existing water rights. Further, the SWRCB expressly allowed processing of water rights applications, like the one at issue, in its Order finding that the water diverted to the Intertie was not fully appropriated. Quantification of the existing water rights was not necessary to evaluate the project’s impacts.

Substantial Evidence Supports the EIR’s Conclusions Regarding Groundwater Impacts

According to the trial court, the project would alter groundwater recovery by making groundwater available for long-term pumping for additional months or years during drought conditions, which, in the trial court’s view, would likely deplete groundwater during a drought. The Second District rejected the lower court’s analysis as factually inaccurate. The purpose of the project is to add to groundwater supplies and increase the availability of groundwater storage. The EIR concludes that the project would raise the local groundwater, resulting in a net increase in aquifer volume. Additionally, the Kern Water Bank Authority’s existing groundwater and monitoring policies will ensure that banking additional groundwater will not lower groundwater tables or affect the production rate of existing wells. Thus, substantial evidence supports the EIR’s conclusion that the project’s groundwater impacts will not be significant.

Conclusions & Implications

The Second District’s decision addresses whether an EIR for a water diversion and storage project must quantify the existing water rights to the underlying waterbody. In holding that such quantification is not required for the Kern Water Bank Authority’s proposed water diversion project, the Court of Appeal adhered to the principle that CEQA does not require an exhaustive analysis, but rather a good faith and reasonable effort at full disclosure. The decision also recognizes that for certain types of projects, particularly those involving water supplies, a project description must be somewhat flexible. The decision illustrates how a court reviewing an EIR must defer to the lead agency’s factual analyses and conclusions—deference that the trial court had failed to give to the Kern Water Bank Authority’s determinations.

– Laura Harris Middleton

SECOND DISTRICT FINDS 90-DAY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES TO LAWSUIT ALLEGING CITY FAILED TO OBTAIN COASTAL DEVELOPMENT PERMIT PRIOR TO ADOPTING SHORT-TERM RENTAL ORDINANCE

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In Coastal Act Protectors v. City of Los Angeles (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 526, the Second District Court of Appeal held a lawsuit alleging the City of Los Angeles was required to obtain a coastal development permit (CDP) prior to the adoption an ordinance imposing restrictions on short-term vacation rentals was subject to the 90-day statute of limitations in Government Code section 65009 subdivision (c)(1)(B). Because the lawsuit was not filed with 90 days, the court dismissed the case.

Background

The City adopted an ordinance imposing restrictions on short-term vacation rentals in December 2018. More than a year later, Coastal Act Protectors (CAP) filed a lawsuit seeking a writ of mandate to enjoin the City from enforcing the ordinance in the Venice coastal zone until the City obtained a CDP pursuant to the California Coastal Act, arguing that the ordinance constituted a “development” under the Act.

The trial court concluded that the 90-day statute of limitations in Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(B), applied to the City’s adoption of the ordinance, and CAP’s petition was therefore untimely. It reasoned that the City’s purported duty to obtain a CDP was a procedural task to perform in enacting a lawful ordinance; therefore, CAP’s petition challenging the City’s failure to obtain a CDP constituted an action to “attack, review, set aside void, or annual” the decision of the City to adopt the ordinance, bringing it within the ambit of Government Code section 65009 subdivision (c)(1)(B). The trial court also addressed the merits of the petition and concluded that the ordinance was not a “development” under the Coastal Act. CAP appealed.

Court of Appeal’s Decision

On appeal, CAP argued that the City’s purported failure to comply with the Coastal Act when it adopted the ordinance was not an “action” or “decision” contemplated by section 65009 of the Government Code, but was instead subject to the three-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (a), for actions “upon a liability created by statute.”

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that CAP’s petition constituted an action to “attack, review, set aside void, or annual” the decision of the City to adopt the ordinance, and therefore, the 90-day limitations period applied. The court explained that, unlike in cases where it would have been impossible for a petitioner to bring a lawsuit within 90 days, the Coastal Act predated the County’s ordinance. If the City did have a duty to obtain a permit for application of the ordinance to residences in the Venice coastal zone, the court held, that duty would have existed when the City enacted the ordinance. The statute of limitations in the Government Code therefore applied. Because CAP waited over a year to file suit, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that the petition was untimely. The court concluded by noting its determination comported with the Legislature’s stated intent to “provide certainty for property owners and local governments regarding” local zoning and planning decisions. (Gov. Code, § 65009, subd. (a)(3).)

Since its holding on the statute of limitations issue was dispositive, the Court of Appeal did not address whether the ordinance constituted a “development” subject to the CDP requirements of the Coastal Act.

– Elizabeth Pollock

THIRD DISTRICT PARTIALLY AFFIRMS JUDGMENTS SETTING ASIDE EIR FOR SPECIFIC PLAN LAND SWAP IN EASTERN PLACER COUNTY

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In a 123-page decision, League to Save Lake Tahoe Mountain Area Preservation Foundation v. County of Placer (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 63, the Third District partially affirmed the trial court’s judgment in two cases granting a petition for writ of mandate, finding that the EIR for the Martis Valley West Parcel Specific Plan (Project) failed to adequately describe the environmental setting of Lake Tahoe regarding water quality, failed to adequately analyze impacts to Lake Tahoe water quality resulting from automobile trips, impermissibly deferred the formulation of mitigation for GHG impacts, failed to analyze proposed mitigation for the Project’s significant and unavoidable traffic impacts on SR 267, and failed to analyze whether renewable energy features could be incorporated into the Project. The Court of Appeal upheld the EIR’s analysis of impacts to forest resources and air quality, including the County’s reliance on the Placer County Air Pollution Control District’s (PCAPCD) thresholds of significance. The court also upheld the County’s decision not to recirculate the Draft EIR and to immediately rezone the subject property out of Timberland Productivity Zone (TPZ). Lastly, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s decision that the EIR did not adequately analyze emergency evacuation impacts.

Background

Real Party in Interest, Sierra Pacific Industries (SPI), owns two undeveloped parcels on either side of SR 267, between Truckee and Lake Tahoe. The West Parcel is southeast of the Northstar Resort and has 1,052 acres. The East Parcel has 6,376 acres.  The existing zoning and land use designation in the Martis Valley Community Plan (MVCP) allows up to 1,360 residential units and 6.6 acres of commercial uses in a 670-acre area of the larger east parcel. Otherwise, both parcels are zoned TPZ and designated as forest in the MVCP. Starting in 2013, SPI and its partners (collectively, Real Parties in Interest or RPI) proposed that the County adopt a specific plan for the two parcels that would amend the MVCP and zoning to move the residential and commercial uses from the East Parcel to the West Parcel, reduce the residential capacity from 1,360 units to 760 units, immediately rezone 662 acres on the West Parcel out of TPZ, and rezone the entire East Parcel as TPZ. Following adoption of the specific plan, the applicants would sell the East Parcel for conservation purposes or place the land in a conservation easement. The effect of the land swap would be to allow development on the West Parcel, adjacent to Northstar and existing residential development, while permanently conserving all 6,376 acres of the East Parcel, connecting some 50,000 acres of open space east of SR 267. Two small areas of both parcels are within the Lake Tahoe Basin, and thus subject to the jurisdiction of the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA), but neither area would be included in the specific plan.

The County circulated a draft EIR for the Project in 2015. In 2016, the County certified the final EIR, immediately rezoned the 662-acre project area of the West Parcel out of TPZ, rezoned the East Parcel to TPZ, and adopted the specific plan.

Sierra Watch, Mountain Area Preservation, and the League to Save Lake Tahoe (collectively, Sierra Watch) filed a lawsuit challenging the EIR and the County’s finding that immediately rezoning the project area on the West Parcel was consistent with the purposes of the Timberland Productivity Act (TPA). The California Clean Energy Committee (CCEC) filed a separate petition, also challenging the EIR. The trial court issued judgments in April and June 2018, rejecting all the challenges to the EIR, with the exception of the EIR’s analysis of impacts to emergency evacuations, and upholding the County’s findings on the immediate rezone out of TPZ. Sierra Watch and CCEC filed separate appeals, and the County and RPI cross-appealed on the emergency evacuation issue.

Court of Appeal’s Decision

On appeal, Sierra Watch argued that the EIR failed to adequately describe the Lake Tahoe Basin’s existing air and water quality, that the County should have adopted the TRPA’s threshold of significance for vehicle miles traveled (VMT) with respect to basin air and water quality, and that the EIR failed to adequately analyze the impacts of project traffic on air and water quality in the basin. Sierra Watch also challenged the County’s decision not to recirculate the EIR following changes to the analysis of GHG impacts, and argued that the adopted GHG mitigation measure was invalid. Lastly, Sierra Watch argued that the County violated the TPA by failing to make required findings. In their cross-appeal, the County and RPI argued that the EIR’s analysis of impacts to emergency evacuations was adequate, and that substantial evidence supported the EIR’s conclusion that the impacts would be less than significant.

CCEC’s appeal argued that the EIR did not adequately describe existing forest resources or analyze cumulative impacts to forest resources, failed to analyze feasible traffic mitigation measures proposed in comments, failed to disclose significant impacts from widening SR 267, and failed to discuss the use of renewable energy sources to meet Project energy demand. CCEC also argued that the adopted GHG mitigation measure was infeasible and unenforceable.

Lake Tahoe

The Court of Appeal found the County was not legally required to use TRPA’s thresholds of significance for measuring the Project’s impacts because, although the two parcels did include land within TRPA’s jurisdiction, the Project was revised to not include those areas. Instead, the County, as the lead agency, had discretion to rely on TRPA’s thresholds or those of another agency, or use their own thresholds, including thresholds unique to the Project. The court also concluded that, while TRPA had “jurisdiction by law” over resources that could be affected by the Project, and was thus, a “Trustee agency” under CEQA, they were not a “Responsible agency” because they had no permitting authority over the Project.
The court also found that the County did not abuse its discretion in adopting the PCAPCD’s thresholds of significance for the project’s air emissions impacts because, contrary to Sierra Watch’s claims, the PCAPCD’s significance thresholds were adopted to address air and water quality (resulting from air emissions) within the Tahoe Basin. However, the EIR failed to adequately describe the existing water quality of Lake Tahoe, which could be impacted by “crushed abrasives and sediment” from project traffic within the basin. According top the court, the EIR did not include a threshold of significance (though several were discussed in post-EIR responses to comments) for such impacts, even though there was substantial evidence that the project-generated traffic would travel within the basin, which the court found to be an abuse of discretion.

Recirculation

Sierra Watch argued that the revisions to the draft EIR’s GHG analysis included in the Final EIR triggered the need to recirculate. The draft EIR included a tiered analysis of GHG impacts. First, annual Project GHG emissions were calculated and compared to PCAPCD’s numeric threshold of 1,100 MTC2E for residential development. Second, although the draft EIR acknowledged that little, if any, of the Project would be constructed by 2020, the EIR compared a completed Project in 2020 with the GHG reduction measures, including those required by law, in place with a “no action” or “business as usual” scenario to determine the Project’s GHG efficiency, pursuant to the California Air Resources Board’s revised Scoping Plan. The draft EIR concluded that, because the Project would generate GHG emissions substantially greater than the numeric threshold, and because it was uncertain what regulatory GHG measures would be in place after 2020, when the Project was likely to begin operating, the impact was significant and unavoidable.

Before the final EIR was published, however, the California Supreme Court issued its decision in Center for Biological Diversity v. California Department of Fish and Wildlife (2015) 62 Cal.4th 204 (Newhall Ranch). Newhall Ranch ruled that an efficiency metric comparing a proposed project to a hypothetical “business as usual” scenario was a permissible way to analyze GHG impacts, but the Scoping Plan’s statewide efficiency threshold required additional evidence and analysis to apply to individual projects, and the EIR in that case did not include the required connection. In response to Newhall Ranch, the final EIR dropped the efficiency analysis, but affirmed the draft EIR’s conclusion that impacts would be significant and unavoidable because the Project would generate emissions exceeding the numeric threshold, and because of the uncertainty around future regulatory GHG reduction measures. The County concluded that, because the significance conclusion did not change, recirculation was not required. The Court agreed recirculation was not required because the final EIR did not show new or substantially more significant effects, and merely clarified or amplified the information provided in the draft EIR.

GHG Mitigation

The court agreed with the appellants that the GHG mitigation measure impermissibly deferred determining the significance of GHG impacts, because the measure required future tentative maps to establish consistency with future efficiency targets adopted in compliance with the Newhall Ranch decision, even though the EIR acknowledged that no such targets existed and may not ever exist. The measure provided a suite of proposed mitigation tools that future maps could use to meet the efficiency targets. The court reasoned that, if no efficiency target consistent with Newhall Ranch became available, mitigation would never be triggered. RPI and the County argued that, if no efficiency targets were available, the 1,100 MTC2E threshold would apply to future maps, but the court found that the language of the measure itself did not include the numeric threshold.

Emergency Evacuations

The court agreed with the County and RPI that the EIR’s analysis of impacts to emergency evacuation plans was adequate and the EIR’s conclusion that impacts would be less than significant was supported by substantial evidence. The court upheld the EIR’s reliance on the questions in Appendix G to the CEQA Guidelines to set a threshold of significance. The EIR acknowledged that adding people and development to the area could exacerbate cumulative impacts to evacuation but concluded that the impact was less than significant because the project would not cut off or modify any evacuation routes and would not prevent an evacuation from occurring or otherwise interfere with the implementation of the County’s evacuation plans. The court found that the conclusion was supported by substantial evidence, including the EIR’s analysis of how long it would take to evacuate the project site, the number of emergency access/evacuation roads included in the project, the requirement that RPI develop a “shelter in place” feature, and the analysis of impacts to fire department response times.

The court acknowledged that evacuation planning involved multiple unknown factors and a host of potential circumstances which made it difficult to predict how an evacuation might play out or how a project could impact such an evacuation. The court reasoned that because the County had discretion as the lead agency to decide how to analyze an impact, the court would defer to the County’s methodology decision provided it was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. The court found that it was. The court concluded that many of Sierra Watch’s challenges to the EIR’s analysis amounted to requests for further analysis, additional modeling, and speculative hypothetical scenarios. The court cited Guidelines sections 15145 and 15151 for the propositions that the EIR need not speculate and need not be exhaustive. While some of the evidence, relating to fire prevention and fire department response times, did not directly relate to emergency evacuation planning, the evidence indirectly supported the County’s conclusions by demonstrating that the project was reducing the likelihood of wildfire on the site and reducing the need for an evacuation.

Sierra Watch also argued that the EIR was internally inconsistent because the traffic analysis reached the opposite conclusion of the emergency evacuation analysis regarding project traffic on SR 267. The court found that the EIR’s conclusion that project generated traffic would have a significant impact on vehicle delay was not inconsistent with the conclusion that project generated traffic would not substantially interfere with emergency evacuation plans. The court reasoned that the two analyses focused on different types of impacts, with time (as measured by vehicle delay) being the focus of the traffic analysis and public safety being the focus of the emergency evacuation analysis.

Forest Resources

The court upheld the EIR’s conclusions that cumulative impacts to forest resources were less than significant. The EIR discussed the County’s 1994 General Plan EIR’s analysis of impacts to forest resources based on projected growth and development in the County and concluded that the Project’s impacts were consistent with and would not exceed the impacts disclosed in 1994 General Plan EIR. The Final EIR concluded that analyzing climate-related forest impacts, such as drought, wildfire, and tree mortality cause by bark beetles, would be speculative, and the court agreed. The court concluded that climate-driven tree mortality was not within the scope of a CEQA cumulative impacts analysis, which required the County to analyze impacts from the Project combined with past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future projects. Tree mortality is not a “project” under CEQA. The court acknowledged that climate-caused tree mortality could be exacerbated by a project, but such impacts would be best analyzed as part of the climate change and GHG analysis. The court concluded that aspect of the GHG analysis was not challenged in this case.

Traffic Mitigation

The EIR concluded that the Project’s traffic impacts on SR 267, measured in terms of delay and using the level of service (LOS) metric, would be significant and unavoidable. The EIR reached this conclusion in part because while the California Department of Transportation had plans to widen SR 267 from two to four lanes, the plan did not cover the portion of SR 267 within the Tahoe Basin, and it was uncertain when the widening would occur. Several commenters suggested that the EIR analyze transportation demand management (TDM) options to reduce traffic on SR 267. The EIR included similar measures for the Project’s impact on public transit but did not analyze whether TDM measures could further reduce the significant traffic impacts. The court, without acknowledging previous rulings by the Third District Court of Appeal finding LOS impacts to be moot given the Legislature’s directive that vehicle delay is not a significant environmental impact, ruled that the EIR failed to analyze facially feasible mitigation proposed in comments and therefore violated CEQA. The Court also found that, while the EIR did not analyze the impacts of widening SR 267, that lack of analysis was not prejudicial error because widening SR 267 was previously approved by the County in the MVCP, which concluded at the time that impacts of such a project would be analyzed in a separate EIR once the improvements were designed.

Energy Resources

Lastly, the court found fault in the EIR’s analysis of impacts to energy resources. The EIR concluded that the Project’s energy consumption impacts would be less than significant because the Project would not result in “wasteful, inefficient, or unnecessary use of energy, or wasteful use of energy resources.” The court, however, ruled that the EIR was required to analyze the Project’s potential use of renewable energy both in determining whether the Project may have a significant impact and how to mitigate that impact. Citing California Clean Energy Com. v. City of Woodland (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 173, 209, the court concluded that the requirement to analyze renewable energy as part of a project’s impact analysis was a procedural requirement of CEQA, which the EIR failed to comply with.

– Nathan George

*RMM Attorneys Whit Manley, Chip Wilkins, and Nate George served as counsel to Real Parties in Interest in the above litigation.

FIRST DISTRICT HOLDS RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH SPECIFIC PLAN AREA IS EXEMPT FROM FURTHER ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW

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In Citizens’ Committee to Complete the Refuge v. City of Newark (2021) 74 Cal.App.5th 460, the First District Court of Appeal upheld the city’s determination that a residential project within a specific plan area was exempt from further environmental review under Government Code section 65457, which provides an exemption from CEQA for housing development proposals that follow a city’s specific plan.

Background

In 2010, the city certified an environmental impact report (EIR) for a specific plan. The specific plan allowed for development of up to 1,260 residential units, and a golf course and related facilities spread across identified subareas (Areas 3 and 4). Area 4 contained wetland habitat for the salt marsh harvest mouse, a state-protected species. After petitioners filed suit under CEQA, the trial court found several deficiencies with the EIR.

In response, the city prepared a recirculated EIR (REIR), which stated that it was a program-level analysis of the impacts related to development of housing and the golf course in Areas 3 and 4 because the final design of those components was not yet known. In March 2015, the city certified the final REIR and re-adopted the 2010 specific plan.

In 2019, the developer submitted a proposed subdivision map for approval of 469 residential lots, omitting the golf course that was previously authorized by the specific plan.

The city prepared a checklist to determine whether the REIR adequately analyzed the environmental impacts of the proposed subdivision map and concluded that the project was consistent with the specific plan and that there were no changed circumstances or new information that might trigger additional environmental review. Accordingly, the city determined the project qualified for the statutory CEQA exemption under Government Code section 65457.

Petitioners challenged the city’s determination, arguing that a subsequent EIR was required due to changes in the project showing that it would have new significant impacts on the endangered harvest mouse.

Court of Appeal’s Decision

To qualify for the Government Code section 65457 exemption, a project must be for residential development, must be consistent with a specific plan for which an EIR was previously certified, and circumstances requiring subsequent environmental review (Pub. Resources Code, § 21166; CEQA Guidelines, § 15162) must not be present.

Petitioners alleged that three changes to the project created new significant impacts triggering the requirement for a subsequent EIR:

(1) Fill of only uplands and not wetlands inhibited wetland migration;

(2) Omission of the golf course deprived the harvest mouse of escape habitat; and

(3) Use of riprap on the banks of elevated upland increased predation of the harvest mouse.

The court disagreed, finding that substantial evidence supported the city’s conclusion that none of the changes significantly increased the impacts on the harvest mouse beyond what the REIR analyzed, i.e., the impacts of the complete development of all of Area 4. The court noted that the project as approved would develop fewer total acres and include far fewer residential units than analyzed in the REIR.

In regard to petitioners’ specific arguments of new impacts, the court held the REIR addressed the impact of loss of upland escape habitat and found that the impact would be less than significant because the uplands did not provide high quality transitional habitat as they were regularly used for agriculture. The project would develop less upland than previously analyzed, meaning the project would eliminate less, not more, upland escape habitat. Additionally, because of the low value of upland habitat, the REIR’s less-than-significant determination did not depend on the golf course continuing to provide upland habitat. Accordingly, the elimination of the golf course did not affect that determination.

While the REIR did not discuss the use of riprap to stabilize the slopes of the filled and raised development areas, the court found this did not require subsequent environmental review because the REIR already examined the issue of rat predation on the harvest mouse and petitioners cited to no evidence that the riprap would substantially increase the severity of predation effects. The court acknowledged that there could be some potential increase in predation due to riprap but recognized that the Section 65457 exemption sets a higher threshold for environmental review. Like other statutory exemptions, the court said, Section 65457 reflects the Legislature’s determination that the interest promoted, which here was to increase the housing supply, was important enough to justify foregoing the benefits of environmental review.

The court also rejected petitioners’ claim that changed circumstances and new information related to sea level rise triggered subsequent review. Petitioners argued that the city was required, due to new scientific insights concerning the amount and rate of sea level rise, to analyze whether the project would exacerbate the effects of sea level rise because of how the project would interact with wetlands in the area (e.g., wetland migration). Even assuming wetland migration must be analyzed under CEQA, the court found that it was mentioned in the original 2010 EIR and the REIR assumed that all developable areas would be impacted. Accordingly, the court concluded that petitioners should have raised this argument in response to the REIR, or even the 2010 EIR.

Finally, the court rejected petitioners’ claim that an adaptive management approach to sea level rise was impermissibly deferred mitigation. The court held that the city’s adaptive responses were not mitigation because sea level rise is not an environmental impact caused by the project that needs to be analyzed under CEQA.

– Nina Berglund

The Future of Wetlands and Waters of the United States: U.S. Supreme Court Grants Review of Sackett v. EPA

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On January 24, 2022, the United States Supreme Court granted review of Sackett v. U.S. EPA (No. 21-454) to consider whether the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals set forth the proper test for determining whether wetlands constitute “waters of the United States” under the federal Clean Water Act. (33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).) The Supreme Court’s second grant of certiorari marks a pivotal development in a long-running legal battle between the Sacketts—an Idaho couple seeking to build a home near Priest Lake—and the EPA, which has maintained that the Sacketts’ property contains wetlands subject to federal jurisdiction and permitting.

Factual Background

The Sacketts own a residential lot in Bonner County, Idaho, that lies just north of Priest Lake. To prepare for construction of a house, the Sacketts filled part of their lot with dirt and rock. Several months later, the Sacketts received a compliance order from the EPA stating that the lot contained wetlands that were adjacent to Priest Lake, which was a “navigable water” within the meaning of section 502(7) of the Clean Water Act (CWA) and constituted “waters of the United States” within the meaning of 40 C.F.R. § 232.2. The compliance order found that the Sacketts violated the CWA by impermissibly discharging pollutants into navigable waters. The order directed the Sacketts to remove the fill and restore the lot to its original condition, or be subject to civil penalties.

March 2012: Initial Lawsuit & Supreme Court Decision

The Sacketts sought, but were denied, an administrative hearing before the EPA. The Sacketts thus filed suit in the U.S. District Court of Idaho, contending that the compliance order violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Sacketts’ due process rights. The petition alleged the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by issuing the compliance order, and deprived the Sacketts of life, liberty, or property without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court dismissed the action due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that the CWA precluded pre-enforcement judicial review of compliance orders, and that such preclusion does not violate the Fifth Amendments’ due process guarantee.

In 2012, the Supreme Court granted review of the Ninth Circuit’s decision to consider whether the EPA’s compliance order constituted a “final agency action” that could be subject to judicial review. The Supreme Court unanimously held in favor of the Sacketts, finding that the order had “all the hallmarks of APA finality.” In an opinion authored by the late Justice Scalia, the court held that the EPA’s order “determined” the “rights or obligations” of the Sacketts by imposing “legal consequences” that “flowed” from noncompliance with its terms. Because the EPA denied them an administrative hearing, the Sacketts possessed “no other adequate remedy in a court” so as to challenge the nature and scope of the order and administrative penalties therein.

August 2021: The Ninth Circuit’s Decision on Remand

On August 16, 2021, the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion on the merits of the Sacketts’ claims. The court of appeal held that the EPA reasonably determined that the Sacketts’ property contained wetlands. The court explained that Justice Kennedy’s interpretation and understanding of “significant nexus” in his concurring opinion in Rapanos v. United States (2006) 547 U.S. 715, provided the standard for determining when wetlands are regulated under the CWA. Applying that test, the panel held that the standard was satisfied because evidence in the record supported EPA’s conclusion that wetlands on the Sacketts’ property were adjacent to a jurisdictional tributary and that, together with a similarly situated wetlands complex, they had a significant nexus to Priest Lake, a navigable water that is regulated under the CWA.

January 2022: The Supreme Court’s Second Grant of Certiorari – Implications

Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Rapanos, most lower courts have relied on Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test as the governing standard. Nevertheless, the split of opinion in Rapanos, coupled with the lack of executive rulemaking to clarify the scope of the EPA’s CWA jurisdiction, has created confusion. As such, the Supreme Court’s second grant of certiorari could mark a momentous step in the ongoing debate about the appropriate “WOTUS” test.

The Supreme Court will consider “whether the Ninth Circuit set forth the proper test for determining whether wetlands are ‘waters of the United States’ under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).” The Sacketts urge the Court to adopt the four-justice plurality’s test in Rapanos, which, unlike the “significant nexus” test, would allow regulation of wetlands only when they have a continuous surface water connection to regulated waters of the United States. In contrast, the EPA maintains that a rule divergent from the significant nexus test would deprive the agency of “authority to protect wetlands separated from a navigable river by a small dune or other natural barrier, even if overwhelming scientific evidence showed that the wetlands significantly affect the river’s ‘chemical, physical, and biological integrity.’”

Though the Court will likely hear this case in October 2022, with a decision to follow in early 2023, it remains to be seen how the pending outcome will affect the EPA’s current implementation of, and revisions to, the “WOTUS” rule. Either way, the scope of federal jurisdiction in regulating and protecting the nation’s wetlands and navigable waters will be decided by our highest court yet again, hopefully yielding greater clarity on the issue rather than further muddying the waters.

– Bridget McDonald

FOURTH DISTRICT HOLDS CITY OF PALM SPRINGS’ SHORT-TERM RENTAL ORDINANCE IS CONSISTENT WITH ZONING CODE

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The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Protect Our Neighborhoods v. City of Palm Springs (Jan. 7, 2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 667 (part. pub.), upheld the City of Palm Springs’ ordinance authorizing short-term rentals in residential zones as consistent with the City’s Zoning Code.

Factual Background

The 2008 Short-Term Rental Ordinance

The City of Palm Springs’ Zoning Code authorizes two uses in a single-family residential (R-1) zone without a permit: (1) a “permanent single-family dwelling”; and (2) uses “customarily incident to the permitted uses when located on the same lot therewith.” All other uses not expressly permitted are prohibited, and the Planning Commission shall not permit commercial uses in such zones.

As a popular vacation destination, the City has expressly allowed for short-term rentals of single-family dwellings since 2008. The corresponding ordinance initially applied to rentals for 28 days or less and limited occupancy based on the number of bedrooms. Rental owners were required to register the property with the City and use “reasonably prudent business practices” to ensure that renters and their guests did not create unreasonable disturbances or engage in disorderly conduct.

The 2016–2017 Ordinance Amendments

In 2016, the City amended the short-term rental ordinance to authorize short-term rentals of single-family residences and duplexes, but not apartments. The City adopted subsequent amendments in 2017, which barred ownership of more than one vacation rental, limited rentals to 36 per year, and added new provisions for “estate homes” (5+ bedrooms) and “homesharing.” The 2017 amendments also included findings that—when taken together—confirmed vacation rentals are permitted in R-1 zones as “ancillary and secondary uses of residential properties.”

Procedural Background

Protect Our Neighborhoods, an organization of homeowners opposed to vacation rentals, filed a petition for writ of mandate alleging the 2017 amendments violated the City’s Zoning Code, General Plan, and CEQA. The trial court denied the petition. Protect Our Neighborhoods appealed on the zoning code claims, but did not appeal the trial court’s ruling on the CEQA or General Plan claims.

The Court of Appeal’s Opinion

On appeal, petitioners alleged short-term rentals violated the zoning code because they are “commercial,” not “residential” uses, and improperly change the character of the R-1 Zone. Petitioners also contended that, if the zoning code permits short-term rentals at all, it only does so on the condition that an owner obtain a land use or conditional use permit.

Conflict With the Zoning Code

Effect of a Conflict

The Court of Appeal rejected petitioners’ contention that the ordinance conflicted with the zoning code. Petitioners treated the code as some kind of “higher law” that invalidated any subsequent conflicting law, even though the zoning code and ordinance are “coequal parts of the Municipal Code.” The court thus reasoned that, to the extent they conflicted with one another, “the most recently enacted statute expressed the will of the Legislature.” Therefore, even if the ordinance and zoning code could not be reconciled, the ordinance would remain valid because the City’s findings evinced its intent to repeal any inconsistent provision of the zoning code.

Existence of a Conflict

The court also rejected petitioners’ claim that vacation rentals constituted “commercial uses” that were barred in R-1 residential zones. The court noted that R-1 zones expressly permit any use that is “customarily incident to” the use of a “permanent single-family dwelling.” A “dwelling” includes “a building or portion thereof designed exclusively for residential occupancy…” Here, the ordinance plainly states that “vacation rentals are an ‘ancillary and secondary use of residential property…’” Petitioners failed to establish that this interpretation was erroneous.

Petitioners also failed to establish how short-term vacation rentals fell within the definition of a “commercial use.” The zoning code meaningfully distinguishes between commercial stays, and the City could reasonably conclude that the short-term rental of a single-family dwelling has different impacts than the short-term rental of a 20, 50, or 100-unit motel. That vacation rentals will impermissibly change the character of the R-1 zone is equally unavailing. Petitioners mistakenly cited to the “business regulations” provision of the code’s “home occupations” chapter, which does not apply to short-term rentals. Nevertheless, even if rentals did affect nearby single-family residents, allowing them was a legislative judgment left up to the City.

The Ordinance’s Findings

Petitioners claimed the ordinance’s supportive findings were internally inconsistent because they impliedly permitted an owner to acquire property and exclusively use it as a short-term rental without ever living in it. The court observed that a property can be “residential,” even if it is vacant. The code defines “dwelling” based on whether the building is designed exclusively for residential occupancy, not whether the building is actually occupied. The building is then limited to use as a single-family residence or uses customarily incident thereto, such as vacation rentals.

Need for a Discretionary Permit

Finally, petitioners argued short-term rentals in R-1 zones required issuance of a discretionary permit. Though the zoning code only requires permits for large day cares, model homes, temporary onsite trailers in conjunction with sale of subdivision lots, accessory apartments, churches, schools, and golf courses in R-1 zones, petitioners argued that vacation rentals have greater impacts than those uses. The court rejected this by observing that the zoning code does not require permits for “similar uses” with “similar impacts.” Rather, uses customarily incident to uses as a single-family dwelling—i.e., vacation rentals—are allowed without a permit.

– Bridget McDonald

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